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Executive Summary 
The United States government has identified intellectual capital loss and 
intellectual property theft of United States research universities by foreign entities 
as a critical problem.  The federal government’s response has been aggressive and 
thorough.  Recommendations have been made to limit the ability of research 
teams comprising foreign researchers to work in government-funded research 
projects, as well as to reduce the budgets of the National Science Foundation and 
the National Institutes of Health.  In addition to causing funding issues that could 
drive researchers to seek out other sources of research funding such as foreign 
entities, these recommendations could have lasting effects on an already-strained 
academic research system suffering from a lack of available research talent. 
Currently, research universities depend on foreign graduate students to 
bolster the work and skill of research teams in the areas of science, technology, 
engineering, and math.  The government recommendations to limit their impact, 
which are not without stimuli such as a growing number of recent cyber attack 
and intellectual property theft cases, contribute to the perception that foreign 
researchers and students are unwelcome in the United States. This perception 
exacerbates the shortage of science, technology, engineering, and math research 
talent for university research efforts, especially because of strong demand by the 
private sector to recruit these students and faculty members.   
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This report discusses and examines the factors surrounding this 
dilemma—government perspective, academic perspective, shortage of graduate 
research students, foreign entities identified as intellectual property risks, cyber 
security, funding, legislation, and policy.  To create more appropriate and 
effective solutions, guidance is provided that reframes the issue as a security 
problem rather than a foreign-entity problem.  The report makes 12 
recommendations based on a best-practices survey of research teams from 39 
premier research institutions to address the issue while preserving the concepts of 
fundamental research and academic freedom. 
Introduction 
The growing global economy is fueled by innovations in technology that 
depend on the development of intellectual property (IP)—making research, 
innovation, and the development of intellectual capital some of the most valuable 
activities in which organizations can invest.  The United States (US) historically 
has been the global leader in innovation and research.  However, this position 
now is being challenged by foreign entities, most notably China (Cimpanu 2018, 
Department of Defense 2018, Haas 2018, Posen 2018). 
Many blame the potential loss of the US’s economic position on the theft 
and loss of IP (Department of Defense 2018, Haas 2018, Halbert 2016).  IP theft 
is a real problem.  The US government has estimated that more than $600 billion 
in trade secrets was stolen from US organizations by foreign entities in a single 
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year (The National Bureau of Asian Research 2017).   Many suggest that China is 
fostering its mission to become the leading world economic power by IP theft 
(Cimpanu 2018, Haas 2018).  Another component complicating the matter is that 
other nations (especially China) do not place the same value or emphasis on IP or 
its protection as does the US (Department of Defense 2018).  These factors create 
a strong motive and vehicle for theft of US IP by other nations. 
Government and business leaders have taken notice of these issues and 
now are calling for restrictions to protect intellectual capital developed in the US 
(Redden 2018).  This reaction seems reasonable given the value and precious 
nature of these resources.  The government’s reaction has been firm and far-
reaching, with calls to restrict government funding for research teams consisting 
of foreign students (Edwards 2016) and to cut the National Science Foundation’s 
(NSF’s) budget by $1 billion (Elis 2019).  Both these actions exacerbate problems 
plaguing research efforts today—funding and a critical shortage of research talent. 
It is important to ensure that actions taken to protect IP do not stifle the 
ability to share information and further scientific discovery and do not destroy the 
ability to create intellectual capital (Norris 2003).  Put another way, we must 
ensure that the cure is not worse than the disease.  To accomplish this goal, 
contributors and decision makers must acknowledge the problem and provide a 
thoughtful response about how to address these government security concerns 
while maintaining the ability to share information freely.  This report explores the 
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issues surrounding this problem and makes practical recommendations to address 
the government’s security concerns while empowering the free exchange of 
information. 
Background 
The current challenge does not represent the first time that US IP has been 
threatened.  During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union competed in the 
Space Race for spaceflight dominance.  The Soviet Union took an early lead in 
this competition by launching Sputnik I and becoming the first country to put an 
artificial satellite into space.  When this occurred, US leaders were shocked into 
action.  The government’s response to Sputnik I was to increase research efforts, 
create programs to increase educational opportunities, and empower Americans—
all in support of driving scientific discovery (Homer, Smith and McCormick 
2008).   
Yet for the similar challenge faced currently, the response seems to be to 
diminish academic freedom and scientific research support rather than strengthen 
it (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016), partly 
because of the nature of academia and the drive to share fundamental research.  
The momentum of knowledge sharing often means that US-based researchers can 
be ignorant regarding the intentions and reach of foreign challengers.  “Many 
U.S.-based researchers are naïve to the methods and intent our foreign adversaries 
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are using to gain access to our sensitive technology.  The result is that they 
become unwitting participants in these talent platforms” (Gamache 2018, 1). 
This is no longer the Cold War era, and the very nature of the problem is 
changed.  Research and IP drive not only military efforts, but economic 
prosperity.  The US is no longer necessarily the world leader in research and 
development (R&D); the US benefits from receiving information in collaboration 
just as much as other nations do.  The world is becoming increasingly global, and 
universities are increasing the international diversity of their student populations.  
Research institutions engage these foreign students to bolster research teams.  
Foreign entities increasingly are funding research efforts and campus initiatives, 
creating a potential conflict of commitment.  The issues surrounding this problem 
are complex, so prescribing a solution to address the problem proves complicated 
at best. 
Problem Statement 
This report addresses the problem of American research university 
intellectual capital loss and IP theft by foreign entities.  The effects of IP theft are 
staggering.  The US has suffered billions of dollars in economic losses due to IP 
theft, losses that are exacerbated by the specific danger of China surpassing the 
US as an economic power by growing its intellectual capital stores (Haas 2018).  
An update to the IP Commission Report estimated that losses due to IP theft are 
more than $225 billion in pirated software and counterfeit goods and as much as 
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$600 billion in theft of trade secrets (The National Bureau of Asian Research 
2017).  
The government’s response to this problem, though, could have 
ramifications beyond the damages already suffered from IP theft—long-lasting 
consequences to academic research and the ability to share information freely, 
both of which drive innovation and scientific discovery.  US lawmakers have 
identified American research universities as prime targets for IP theft by foreign 
entities.  Several recent events bolster this perception: recent cyber attacks by Iran 
against 70 universities around the world (Osborne 2018), the National Bureau of 
Asian Research’s report on IP theft designating specific foreign entities as likely 
cyber aggressors and identifying research institutions as prime targets for attack 
(The National Bureau of Asian Research 2017), and allegations of theft of US 
research by foreign entities such as China (Llorente 2019).  One such example is 
that of Dr. Yiheng Percival Zhang, who is accused of fraud, having applied for 
and received funding in the US for research already conducted in China. 
There are many other similar incidents contributing to the perception of 
significant IP theft and conflict of commitment on the part of foreign researchers.  
Consequently, the federal government is calling for strong measures to address 
this problem, such as more stringent screening of foreign students to hinder spies 
from gaining access to academic research facilities (Ross 2018).  Lawmakers and 
government stakeholders are proposing greater security restrictions be placed on 
ADDRESSING IP THEFT WHILE PRESERVING RESEARCH 
 
10 
 
federally funded research projects that could be vital to national security 
(Edwards 2016).   
The measures resulting from the government response to this problem 
could be extremely taxing to research universities, which are struggling on many 
levels already.  If not properly addressed, this issue could have the following 
negative impacts on research institutions: 
1. Exacerbation of research talent shortage—Currently, there is a dearth 
of research talent.  US research institutions have sought to fill this void 
by attracting foreign research talent.  Even though the concerns over IP 
theft are directed at a small percentage of bad actors, the actions and 
communications around this issue could contribute to the perception 
that foreign graduate students are no longer welcome in the US.  
Anecdotally, one major research institution has reported a 50% drop in 
foreign graduate applications for a hard science program (T. Smith, 
personal communication, March 7, 2019). 
2. Reduction in government funding for research—Recently, statements 
have proposed a 13% budget reduction for the NSF and a 12% budget 
reduction for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (Achenbach, et al. 
2019), amounting to $1 billion and $4.5 billion lost, respectively.  
Both agencies are major funders of US research, and the effects of 
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these budget cuts could drive US researchers to work with other 
funding sources such as foreign entities. 
3. Restrictions on the ability of foreign researchers to participate in 
government-funded research—Government officials have proposed 
restricting participation in government research projects based on 
research team composition (Edwards 2016).   This measure could have 
far-reaching implications.  Some universities or researchers might opt 
out of critical research initiatives, the government might eliminate the 
ability of some institutions to obtain federal research funding, and the 
lack of available research talent will be exacerbated further, which 
could cause the US to miss out on the opportunity to generate 
significant scientific discoveries. 
4. Deincentivization of the academic science, technology, engineering, 
and math (STEM) workforce—Research institutions compete with the 
private sector for STEM talent, with recent graduates finding few 
incentives to take on research roles after earning their degrees.  STEM 
graduates command some of the highest salaries in the job market, 
with starting average salaries ranging from $62,177 to $69,188 
annually (Ascione 2019).  In high-demand areas such as cyber 
security, first jobs could even earn as much as a six-figure salary.  
These numbers are contrasted with the choice to go on to graduate 
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studies and contribute to research efforts, which incurs $50,000 to 
$100,000 in additional tuition costs and abandons two years of lost 
wages and career progression.  Many opt to head for the private sector 
in the first place, and a mismanagement response to IP theft provides 
even more justification. 
The response to this matter may have far-reaching consequences on the 
ability of US research institutions to conduct research.  Fundamental research and 
the free exchange of information are the primary drivers for educating the 
workforce and generating scientific discoveries, and the system is already 
suffering from many challenges—further inhibiting this process could have 
drastic consequences for science and society (Homer, Smith and McCormick 
2008, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016).  
Accordingly, government concerns regarding this issue must be addressed quickly 
and comprehensively. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purposes of this study were to examine the potential threat of 
American intellectual capital loss and IP theft by foreign-entity interactions with 
American research universities and to provide recommendations to address 
government concerns.  These aims were accomplished by conducting a systematic 
literature review, applying a risk management framework to examine the problem, 
and reviewing a survey of best practices for research institutions.     
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  The information gathered in this study and the recommendations made in 
this report can be used by the American Association of Universities (AAU) and 
its member institutions to prepare responses to address issues regarding the 
growing threat of IP theft while preserving the principles of academic freedom 
and fundamental research.  
Research Questions 
Research questions for this study include the following: 
Q1:  How can potential threats to American intellectual capital be properly 
addressed while preserving the concept of fundamental research? 
Q2:  What are the inherent risks to academia actively engaging with 
foreign entities for activities such as recruitment, research, sponsorship, funding, 
academic collaboration, and student development? 
Q3:  How has the definition of intellectual capital changed and influenced 
this issue? 
Methodology 
The methodology used in this study was a systematic literature review, 
application of a risk management framework to examine the problem, and review 
of a best-practices survey of member institutions conducted by the AAU and the 
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU).  
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Systematic Literature Review 
Systematic literature reviews have been used extensively in social science 
research such as business, public administration, education, and information 
systems to gather facts and historical information about problems to be examined 
(Jesson, Mattheson and Lacey 2011, Kim 2018, Thomas and Hornsey 2014, 
Thomas 2017).  The research team conducted thorough research utilizing 
university academic libraries, dedicated research tools such as EBSCO and 
ProQuest databases, and open Internet data sources such as Google Scholar.  
Keyword searches were used to identify materials of interest and included terms 
such as IP theft, intellectual capital, China, research university, and various 
combinations and delineations.  This effort enabled the team to identify specific 
resources from the vast array of data that exist. 
Risk Management Framework 
A risk management framework from the cyber security domain was 
selected as a way to frame the problem.  Cyber security is a growing concern for 
nearly all organizations (DHS 2015, Morgan 2017, Newman 2018, Thomas 
2018).  It seems that new stories of security breach resulting in exposure of 
personal and confidential information appear daily.  Consequently, risk 
management and the ability to recover from cyber attacks are critical to 
maintaining ongoing operations and protecting vital data and IP (Harnedy 2016, 
Thomas and Galligher 2018).  The recent surge of exposure from cyber attacks 
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has forced many organizations around the world to focus on robust security 
practices to protect vital IP and intellectual capital. 
The risk formula used for this study is as follows (Impe 2018): 
Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence 
This basic formula provided an intuitive method to help stakeholders 
conceptualize this complex problem.  In looking at this formula, it became clear 
that substantial disagreement exists on the consequences of certain actions 
(limiting the open exchange of information) and the threat posed by the human 
talent on research teams, particularly those individuals foreign to the US. 
ISACA®, a leading cyber security standards and certification organization 
that, for years, has set the standard for cyber security audits and compliance, 
recommends the risk management framework shown in Figure 1 to protect data 
and intellectual property. 
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Figure 1. Risk assessment framework, adapted from (Gelbstein 2013). 
  
This model was used as a lens through which to view the problem of intellectual 
capital loss and IP theft of American research universities by foreign entities.  In 
the threat category, force of nature was excluded because it was not found to 
apply to the research problem.  The team focused on human accidental threats and 
human deliberate threats. 
 Human accidental threats are those that result from unintentional 
behaviors such as being tricked to perform an action or being unaware that an 
action will have negative consequences (Gelbstein 2013).  Generally, this type of 
threat is addressed by user education.  For example, phishing is the most common 
vector for cyber attack (Aguilar 2015, PhishMe 2016, Thomas 2018).  Phishing 
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occurs when cyber attackers or other ill-meaning actors attempt to target an end-
user with information that would lend credibility to the message or the request.  
An end-user might receive a message containing facts that are familiar to the user, 
or the sender of the message may be pretending to be a trusted source, such as a 
bank or organization to which the user belongs.  
 Human intentional threats refer to deliberate actions by humans to violate 
established rules and compromise security (Gelbstein 2013).  In cyber security, 
this type is referred to as an “insider threat.”  Insider threats are particularly 
dangerous because insiders have unfettered access to systems and information 
(Elifoglu, Abel and Taşseven 2018).  The negative consequences resulting from 
an insider threat can be the result of a bad actor’s purposeful actions or when an 
insider is placed under duress or undue influence, such as bribery. 
 Using this risk management framework enabled the team to focus on the 
pivotal point of the problem—human interaction.  As humans are the operative 
point of these exposures, either inside or outside the organization, it became clear 
to the research team that this is a security problem hinged on addressing 
unintentional and intentional human behavior to cause harm to the system or to 
steal IP.  
Organizational Survey Results 
The AAU and APLU have worked diligently to identify best practices for 
universities to protect research from threats such as IP theft, academic espionage, 
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and efforts from foreign governments or other entities seeking to have undue 
influence on research institutions or to subvert the practice of core academic 
values such as scientific integrity and free speech (AAU & APLU 2019).  The 
associations worked together to conduct the survey to identify effective practices, 
tools, policies, and resources used by member institutions to address foreign 
security threats.  Data were gathered from 39 member institutions, with more than 
140 examples of best practices shared.  The research team reviewed a summary of 
this information, and items from the survey are detailed in the recommendations 
at the end of the report. 
The Importance of Academic Freedom 
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
outlines the basic tenets of academic freedom. Among those tenets is the belief 
that pedagogical research is protected from undue outside influence.  Faculty are 
free to conduct research on any given subject and publish the results without fear 
of consequence from the university (American Association of University 
Professors n.d.).  This ideal establishes the concept of integrity within the 
American academic community that publication of the results of academic 
research is open to not only acclaim and potential use for applied research, but 
also criticism.  One of the shared themes of concern among American research 
investigators is related to academic freedom abroad.  For example, the Chinese 
government has been known to dictate research for its scientists and restrict the 
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opportunity to conduct fundamental research that does not have specific 
implications for applied research aligned with their governmental goals 
(Suttmeier, Scientific American 2018).  This example serves as just one reason 
why preserving academic freedom in the US is vital to its continued position as a 
world leader in scientific research. 
The Importance of Fundamental Research 
Fundamental or basic research is defined in US legal terms as “systematic 
study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental 
aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications 
towards processes or products in mind” (Cornell Law School n.d.).  While the 
science of discovery is exciting, it also has many challenges.  A decrease in 
funding fundamental research puts America’s status as a leader in scientific 
knowledge at risk because fewer graduates pursue research as a career, and 
reduced funding makes it difficult to acquire the resources necessary to conduct 
basic research; yet basic research is necessary to develop new technology that has 
the potential to impact many sectors like defense, technology, and healthcare 
(Karagianis 2014).  
The speed at which fundamental research can be conducted has continued 
to improve with the advent of technology.  For example, the Internet makes it 
possible to find basic research that has been conducted on related concepts with a 
quick search engine inquiry, which can then be downloaded for review just as 
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quickly.  The open environment fosters curiosity and applied development 
research that seeks to address specific problems, which leads to 
commercialization opportunities (Remedios 2006).  This connection was 
supported by a review of patents issued from 1976 to 2015 that were cross-
referenced with more than 32 million scientific articles published after World War 
II; the review associated 80% of articles with at least one citation with future 
patents (Ahmadpoor 2017).  
Information sharing is augmented by collaboration as well.  Collaboration 
can resolve funding challenges, and, where geographical distance may have been 
difficult to overcome before the Internet, it can unite global field experts for the 
purpose of scientific inquiry without restriction.  Significant debate exists on the 
effect of reduced funding for fundamental research, and what is available, some 
would argue, is not spread throughout the US in an equitable manner; therefore, 
state legislators have called for collaborative partnerships with international 
scientists and funding sources to pursue scientific research (Hoy 2018).  These 
collaborative partnerships are well established in international countries like 
Japan, where research funding has continued to decline.  In an effort to keep pace, 
Japan has accepted a partnership with China to open up new avenues of research 
that were not available previously because of budget constraints, as well as to 
yield higher-quality results from the information exchange between the two 
countries.  Of the nearly 25,000 signed academic partnerships in Japan, 4,500 are 
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with China and 3,187 are with the US (Kakuchi 2018).  To understand the rate at 
which international scientific collaboration is accelerating, an evaluation of 
published research in six top-tier and four mid-tier journals found that 
international collaboration increased from 25% in 2000 to nearly 50% in 2015 
(University of Michigan 2017).  
The Government’s Concerns 
The importance of academic freedom is paramount to the integrity and 
credibility of US-based research institutions, but to understand the complexity of 
the problem facing American universities in today’s competitive global 
environment, we also must examine the concerns of the primary funder of 
sponsored research in the US—the federal government. To put it in perspective, 
the NIH is a major funding source for university-based research.  The research 
budget for the NIH is more than $37 billion, of which only 10% is earmarked for 
NIH research conducted in its own labs.  The majority of NIH funding is awarded 
to more than 2,500 universities and other research facilities via a competitive 
process; more than 50,000 projects have been awarded (National Institutes of 
Health 2018).  A statement released by the NIH director identified three primary 
concerns that need to be reinforced to limit vulnerability and susceptibility to theft 
among US research facilities (Collins 2018).  These concerns, while identified 
specifically by the NIH, apply to all agencies that engage in government-
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sponsored research (NIH Advisory Committee to the Director 2018).  The first 
concern relates to disclosure challenges. 
 For example, often physicians at academic health centers are on staff or 
provide consulting services to drug companies.  As it currently stands, anyone 
participating in research sponsored by government funding sources like the NIH 
is required to disclose their income and stock ownership related to activity like 
consulting services to pharmaceutical companies to limit conflicts of interest.  In a 
federal investigation, authorities found that principal investigators requesting 
federal funding were engaged in fraudulent reporting of income or simply were 
not complying with the Public Health Service regulation that requires them to 
disclose any income exceeding $10,000 or 5% ownership (Kaiser 2008). 
 These disclosures also are required where foreign entities are concerned. 
Some investigators do not disclose that they receive resources, whether outright 
financial support for equipment and/or paid faculty and support staff, from foreign 
sources or entities with competing interests (NIH Advisory Committee to the 
Director 2018).  As the old saying goes, “He who has the gold makes the rules.” 
As such, the government has cause for concern where universities don’t fully 
disclose all of their financial relationships because the integrity of the research 
could be compromised by outside funding sources causing undue influence.  For 
example, a survey of academic health center faculty concluded that increased 
pressure on faculty to raise their own money to support additional research, 
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salaries, and operations leads to misbehavior.  Responses indicated that federally 
funded researchers are likely to engage in one misbehavior, while privately 
funded scientists are likely to engage in two or more misbehaviors, with the 
severity of their offenses being higher.  Those whose livelihood or academic 
survival depends on raising their own capital are more likely to engage in 
misbehaviors because they have the most to lose (Martinson, et al. 2009).  Thus, 
we can infer that researchers who also are sponsored or employed by foreign 
entities in some capacity are more likely to be subject to undue influence 
compared to peers who are not sponsored by foreign sources. 
Further, faculty and support staff being funded by outside sources may 
create security breaches in the IP being funded by US-based governmental 
agencies (Collins 2018).  An example of this is the Chinese talent recruitment 
program called Thousand Talents. The Chinese government sponsors students 
who have the ability to attain highly prized US-based research posts for the 
purpose of acquiring IP that then is disclosed to the Chinese government (Facher 
2018).  In some cases, the Chinese government also has been known to create 
shadow labs in China that resemble and work in sync with the information given 
to them by the Chinese-supported talent pool (Facher 2018).  
One well-documented case of this type is that of the “invisibility cloak” 
led by Duke University principal investigator Dr. David Smith.  Smith hired 
student and Chinese national Liu Ruopeng to work on a project using 
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metamaterials to make items invisible to object-detecting equipment.  Naturally, 
because of the defensive implications of materials that can go undetected, the 
Department of Defense was a major sponsor of Smith’s work.  Later, Dr. Smith 
learned that Ruopeng’s friends took pictures of his lab and recreated the project in 
their lab in China.  Ruopeng marketed the material for monetary gain; he is now 
worth an estimated $2.7 billion (McLaughlin 2018, Reisch 2018).  
The last concern outlined by the NIH director is the vulnerability of the 
peer review process (Collins 2018).  The NIH and other agencies have learned of 
several breaches in the peer review process leading to foreign entities obtaining 
confidential information documented in grant proposals (NIH Advisory 
Committee to the Director 2018).  Those breaches have undermined the peer 
review process for US funding agencies and needlessly have exposed IP in grant 
proposals to foreign entities with the intent to exploit it for their gain.  While the 
NIH is leading the charge on addressing these challenges, it is not the only 
governmental funding source that is subject to these concerns (NIH Advisory 
Committee to the Director 2018).  Moreover, China is not the only foreign entity 
pursuing IP theft via US-based research.  Russia and Iran have been identified as 
top threats to national security because they have extracted IP from more than 140 
US universities (Riggi 2018).  They also have hacked the email accounts of 
approximately 8,000 university personnel across the US, an act that rewarded 
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them with 35 billion pages of research worth approximately $3.4 billion (Reisch 
2018). 
Foreign Intellectual Property Theft 
IP theft is an expensive problem.  In an update to the IP Commission 
Report, it was estimated that losses due to IP theft are more than $225 billion 
annually from pirated software and counterfeit goods and as much as $600 billion 
annually due to theft of trade secrets (Ackerman 2018, The National Bureau of 
Asian Research 2017).  US lawmakers have identified American universities as 
prime targets for intellectual capital theft by foreign entities, calling for more 
stringent screening of foreign students to hinder those with mal intent from 
gaining access to academic research facilities (Ross 2018); however, there are no 
specific distinctions within the IP Commission Report that specify estimates of 
loss among sectors, which may indicate some misaligned speculation among 
legislators in naming higher education as the primary target for IP theft.  Yet the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned that foreign spies are already 
active in American universities in all 50 states and that they have earned the 
confidence of their colleagues, thereby making them virtually undetectable.  At a 
meeting in Houston, the FBI, along with Texas academic and research institution 
leaders, discussed the rapidly evolving threat of academic espionage in an effort 
to collaborate and find solutions that work to enforce the law while preserving the 
tenets of academic freedom (Ackerman 2018). 
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While some advocate for limiting the number of international students on 
campuses because of the risk of theft, this solution comes with a cost, too.  Many 
professors agree that most international students come to the US with good 
motives and that restricting their admission could have dire consequences on the 
free exchange of ideas and scientific pursuits (Reisch 2018).  Limiting the number 
of international students on campuses across the US also could have severe 
financial consequences for universities, their domestic students, and the US 
economy. 
Because international students are not eligible for in-state tuition, their 
fees subsidize those of their in-state peers.  In 2015, foreign students comprised 
12% of the student population in public universities; yet 28% of the revenue at 
those same institutions came from that small population.  Seventy-two percent of 
the international student population pays for tuition with support from one or 
more of the following sources: university assistance, home country sponsorship, 
family finances, or personal finances. Further, international student enrollment 
has been credited with adding $30 billion to the US economy in the 2015 
academic year (Loudenback 2016).  If universities were to lose international 
student revenue, they would be forced to pass on that cost to domestic students.  
Another implication of IP theft is the active and ongoing evaluation of 
academic visas for students.  Currently, President Trump is seeking counsel on 
restricting academic visas specifically for Chinese students in an effort to mitigate 
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academic IP theft (Ambrose 2018).  Because China is well known for cyber 
breaches that have resulted in the theft of IP (Barhat 2018) and because 
lawmakers and governmental stakeholders are proposing greater security 
restrictions on federally funded research projects that could be vital to national 
security, restrictions on academic visas may be closer than anyone realizes.  
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security oversees the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP).  The SEVP uses the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) database to monitor any international 
student’s eligibility to be admitted as a foreign student; data are accessed by 
universities attended by the student to notify the institution of any restrictions or 
requirements related to their academic visa (Department of Homeland Security 
2018).  The F-1 visa, which stipulates that a student must intend to return home 
upon graduation, is the most widely applied for and issued academic visa.  A 
foreign student applies for an academic visa via the US Embassy in the country of 
their residence.  Upon doing so, the student must provide documentation of 
finances, family, and prospective job offers that would exist following 
achievement of their degree (International Student 2019).  
According to Dr. Kevin Gamache, Chief Research Security Officer for the 
Texas A&M University System, visa officers spend approximately three minutes 
reviewing visa applications and the documentation that accompanies them (K. 
Gamache, personal communication, March 7, 2019).  When an international 
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student applies for an academic visa, allotting an appropriate amount of time to 
vet the application thoroughly and trace the financial support of the student can 
eliminate bad actors before they are admitted to study in the US.     
Should the pendulum swing too far and the restrictions on academic visas 
become too costly or difficult to overcome, combatting the IP theft problem in 
this manner at research universities would prove challenging because it endangers 
foundational scholarly precepts such as fundamental research and academic 
freedom (Edwards 2016), which may affect adversely the willingness of some 
institutions to participate in government-funded research initiatives.  
The relationship between university research programs and the federal 
government continues to evolve, but it has been based on the tenets of academic 
freedom.  As such, fundamental research has been the primary driver for 
educating the workforce and generating scientific discoveries; disturbing this 
relationship, even in the name of national security, could have drastic 
consequences for science and society (Homer, Smith and McCormick 2008, 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016).  
Funding 
Prior to World War II, industry funded most university research (Atkinson 
2018).  However, during World War II, the US government took strategic interest 
in funding and supporting scientific research at universities.  After the successful 
Soviet Union launch of Sputnik I, American leadership came to the realization 
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that the US was on the verge of being surpassed by its nearest rival and responded 
by increasing its focus on research universities to maintain its world position as 
the leader in scientific discovery (Homer, Smith and McCormick 2008).   
Basic research accounted for 64% of university research in 2012.  Of the 
$75 billion in funding for basic research in 2012, the federal government 
supported 52.6% of those dollars, down from its peak of 70.3% in the 1970s.  In 
2012, universities performed the largest portion of basic research across all 
entities at 53.5%.  At its peak, the federal government was the largest supporter of 
basic research at universities in 1965 at 77.3%.  In 2012, that share had declined 
to 60.7%.  In the same timeframe, universities bridged the gap in the decline by 
allocating more of their own budgets to support basic research from 7.1% to 21% 
(Association of American Universities 2015).  Table 1 shows federal funding of 
basic research by agency. 
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Table 1 
Federal Research Funding by Agency (from AAU [2015]) 
 
 
Federal support for basic research accounted for 63% of the $71.8 billion 
spent in 2016 (The National Science Foundation 2018).  In 2015, the total spend 
on all types of research was $499 billion, of which approximately one-sixth was 
basic research.  The bulk of the spend was $316 billion for development, mostly 
performed outside of higher education with private firms looking to increase their 
bottom line (Mervis 2017). 
R&D is big business in the US.  As of 2015, the US led the world in 
expenditures on R&D at nearly $497 billion, or 2.7% of its gross domestic 
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product (GDP) (Showstack, EOS Earth & Space Science News 2018).  R&D 
funding for universities peaked at 73% in the late 1960s.  Following its peak, it 
slowly declined and currently hovers near the 60% mark, although funding for 
higher-education institutional research has remained flat since 2005.  The 
business share of R&D support has increased from 3% to 6% since the 1960s, and 
universities are increasing their subsidies of R&D as well from 10% to more than 
30% in the same timeframe.  The NSF has stated that more than $55 billion in 
R&D is conducted by colleges and universities annually (American Association 
for the Advancement of Science n.d.).  In 2016, institutions of higher education 
spent $71.8 billion on R&D, 94% of which was spent on science and engineering 
endeavors.  University expenditures on each of the NSF classifications of 
research—basic, applied, and developmental—were 63%, 28%, and 9%, 
respectively.  Approximately 44% of all expenses were attributed to the human 
capital necessary to conduct research.  Direct and indirect costs of conducting 
research accounted for the other 56%.  While federal support has been declining, 
it is still a primary source of funding for academic research, accounting for about 
60% of academic funding, while approximately 25% comes from the institutions 
themselves.  The government spent $38.8 billion on funding R&D for universities 
and colleges in 2016; 90% of this funding came from six federal agencies: 
Department of Health and Human Services ($53.3 billion), Department of 
Defense ($13.7 billion), NSF ($13.2 billion), Department of Energy ($4.6 billion), 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration ($3.8 billion), and Department of 
Agriculture ($3.1 billion) (National Science Board 2018).  
Following World War II, the US became the world leader in R&D by 
funding 69% of all R&D worldwide.  Since other countries began funding R&D 
in 1953, the US has accounted for 28% of worldwide R&D funding as recently as 
2015.  The federal government and business have provided the lion’s share (more 
than 90%) of R&D funding since 1953.  In 1964, the federal government was the 
largest source of subsidy for R&D at 66.8%, and business was the lowest at nearly 
31%.  Since then, the roles of R&D share have reversed, with business being the 
primary source of R&D funding at 69.4% and the federal government at 25.1% in 
2000.  In 2015, the largest portion of funding for basic research, 44.3%, came 
from the federal government, while business was the largest subsidizer of applied, 
53.3%, and developmental, 82.3%, research.  Of those funding sources, 49.1% of 
basic research, 18% of applied research, and 2% of developmental research was 
performed by institutions of higher education (Sargent Jr. 2018). 
While the US has been the world leader in R&D since World War II, there 
are major issues at play that may unseat America from the top spot.  The primary 
issues threatening to remove the US as the world’s research superpower are 
reductions to the federal budget that underwrite academic research and Chinese 
policies and investments in strategic initiatives like Thousand Talents, Made in 
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China by 2025, and World Leader in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 (Guarino, 
Rauhala and Wan 2018).  
While the 2018 federal budget for the Department of Defense as related to 
the research component was increased by $865 million compared to the previous 
year, the bulk of the increase was earmarked for applied R&D (Hampson 2018).  
Department of Defense budget requests for 2019 have been met with opposition 
to increased funding for research, development, testing, and evaluation across all 
sectors of the armed forces and for the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA).  In fact, when compared to the 2018 budget, nearly every 
major project or initiative, as well as those for each type of research across the 
spectrum, was assigned significantly less money in the 2019 budget.  The single 
largest reduction was a 31.02% decrease to applied research for the US Army 
(Association of American Universities 2018).  Later budget ratifications did 
include across-the-board decreases in all Department of Defense sectors except 
DARPA, which received a small increase in the applied and advanced technology 
budget for research (Hourihan 2018). 
Agencies like the NIH and the NSF fund research out of discretionary 
budgets.  A reduction to those budgets means removing funding from one 
program to fund research, which seems unlikely given that their budgets are 
consistently flat or reduced.  Researchers have been successful at obtaining 
funding from the NIH and the NSF slightly less that one out of every five times, 
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meaning that researchers must seek other funding opportunities and that many 
research projects cannot be maintained, certainly not to the extent and duration 
required to fund long-term research (Howard 2013). 
Further, a proposed 20% cut to the NIH budget could have implications 
not just for higher-education research, but also for economic development, a 
conclusion based on a review of more than 365,000 grants awarded by the NIH 
from 1980 to 2007 that found 8.4% of awards to be directly responsible for US 
patents and more than 31% of grants to lead to research cited by other patents 
(Hampson 2018).  Reducing the funding dedicated to biomedical research as 
supported by the NIH is a significant threat to the US position as a leading 
authority in scientific biomedical research (University of Michigan 2017).  The 
federal budget is not something that is easily agreed upon; therefore, it is 
imperative that bipartisan support of federally sponsored research is not 
neglected.  
As outlined above, cuts to federal budgets and difficulty obtaining and 
retaining grant funding for ongoing research proposals create many challenges in 
American academia because they give China the opportunity to recruit the 
brightest American minds to study in China, where incentives are many and 
where ongoing research funding is guaranteed.  Highly regarded scientists are 
moving labs from Ivy League schools to China because of generous sign-on 
bonuses, high pay, world-class lab facilities, well-trained staff, and guarantees of 
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continued funding, as well as other fringe benefits for family members (Guarino, 
Rauhala and Wan 2018).  
The Chinese government has had trouble with some of its own laws 
regarding recruitment of these American researchers.  For example, recruiting has 
been held up in the bureaucratic process until a Chinese-born collaborator has 
been found to partner with the recruit.  As such, the Chinese State Administration 
of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA) was moved to become a department of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST).  The theory behind the move was 
to make it easier for foreign scientists to be granted the right to work in China.  
The SAFEA department oversees the Foreign Expert Recruitment Scheme, as 
well as the Thousand Talents program.  A Duke University biologist serving as an 
advisor to the Chinese government for talent initiatives has made it clear that 
recruitment of foreign scientists to China is possible because funding in the US is 
on the decline.  Moving SAFEA to the oversight of MOST removed some of the 
barriers preventing recruitment, like partnering with a Chinese-born collaborator.  
The ministry also is poised better to fast-track foreign experts who can fill high-
need positions (Jia 2018, Kenderdine 2017).  However, some Chinese researchers 
are concerned that the reorganization will make governmental initiatives a top 
priority instead of scientific inquiry leading the process; bureaucracy will and 
could consequently damage credibility of Chinese-led research.  The Chinese 
government maintains this move as strengthening their position, not 
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compromising it, and they will continue to work to promote international 
collaboration free from governmental requirements to pursue one type of research 
over another (Sharma 2018). 
China’s strong financial commitment to R&D has enabled the country to 
become a global leader in research (American Association for the Advancement 
of Science n.d.).  China has increased its investment in research as a percentage of 
its GDP from 0.9% in 2000 to 2.0% in 2015, with a goal of 2.5% by 2020.  It is 
ranked second to the US in R&D expenditures at 20% of the world total.  Further, 
China is now second to the US in the number of doctoral degrees in science and 
engineering (Gupta and Wang 2016).  For comparison, while the US continues to 
fund R&D and increased its allocations by an average of 4% each year from 2000 
to 2015, China has had an average 18% growth year over year in funding R&D 
(Guarino, Rauhala and Wan 2018).  
To date, the US has led the world in R&D expenditures.  As much as 37% 
of global R&D was attributed to the US in 2000, but the number fell to 26% in 
2015.  China’s total increased to 21% in the same timeframe.  As of 2015, China 
became second to the US in R&D expenses, beating out the European Union, 
which is now third in R&D expenses globally (Showstack, EOS Earth & Space 
Science News 2018).  While the US is regarded as the global scientific research 
leader, this regard is not likely to hold, as China is set to outpace the US in R&D 
expenses by 2022 (University of Michigan 2017). 
ADDRESSING IP THEFT WHILE PRESERVING RESEARCH 
 
37 
 
 Since 2014, the Chinese government has worked on a financial 
restructuring plan for the purpose of rapidly expanding R&D expenditures.  The 
plan includes redirecting local funds to approximately 1,000 industrial 
development investment funds that total the equivalent of $500 billion.  The 
Chinese government also has mandated that state-owned enterprises are required 
to redirect 1.5% of revenue to R&D, further increasing the funding available for 
R&D projects (Kenderdine 2017).  In 2017, 77% of China’s spend on R&D was 
allocated from Chinese enterprise (South China Morning Post 2018), indicating 
that mandatory R&D allocations by enterprise have been beneficial for the 
country.  
While the Chinese are making advances that would lead competing 
nations to think that the country soon will be the global leader of scientific 
research, concern still exists among the academic community, some arguing that 
China’s research lacks the depth and rich history of scientific leadership (Barhat 
2018) and that issues still exist within Chinese-sponsored research that need to be 
addressed.  Ethical concerns top the list because China does not have a regulatory 
system like the US to prevent the abuse of human subjects, which could discredit 
research.  Additionally, the Chinese government has been known to impose 
quotas for published articles, which has led to several hundred articles being 
discredited for poor quality (Guarino, Rauhala and Wan 2018).  While the 
Chinese have been able to invest substantial sums of money in R&D, some argue 
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that for all the expense and effort, the result is not as grand as the Chinese would 
like.  From 2010 to 2015, only 2.2% of US patents were issued to Chinese-based 
applicants compared to 18.8% from Japan and 5.5% from both Germany and 
South Korea.  Further, China does not have a single university on the list of top 30 
global universities cited in scientific journals (Gupta and Wang 2016).  In many 
communities, the underlying concern about Chinese research is that objectives are 
dictated by the state government, which can feel restrictive to scientists and can 
hinder organic scientific developments.  As time passes and China’s R&D 
expenditures surpass those of the US, it will be of significant importance to 
observe how China manages the ethical dilemmas of driving science based on 
governmental objectives (Suttmeier 2018).  
Issues Affecting the Intellectual Property Theft Problem 
The Disappearing American Graduate Student 
American universities have large populations of international students.   
More than one million international students are enrolled currently in higher-
education programs in the US.  Approximately 5% of all students enrolled in 
higher education in America are international students (Leiber 2018).  These 
numbers show a substantial increase from foreign student enrollment in the 1950s, 
which was estimated at approximately 35,000.   
A report by Lieber (2018) outlined the need to attract foreign talent to 
work in American research programs.  While many countries offer grants and 
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assistance for students wishing to study in the US, students must be accepted into 
American institutions before they can quality for these assistance programs.  
Further, students must be accepted into American education institutions before 
they can apply for student visas (Leiber 2018).  Lieber’s (2018) report also 
suggested that it is difficult for foreign student to obtain work visas in the US.   
Many business schools inform prospective international students about the 
challenges of obtaining employment in America as part of their orientation 
programming.   
Foreign-student applications to American universities dropped 11% in 
2018, according to a survey of 400 US institutions offering graduate business 
programs (Leiber 2018).  Some 47% of non-US students considering Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) programs outside of their home countries favor 
American research institutions as their first choice for attendance, a 9% drop from 
the same survey conducted in 2016 (Leiber 2018).  This decline raises concern for 
American research institutions, which already are suffering from a lack of 
graduate research talent.   
The value of global exchange students.   
Failing to engage foreign graduate students could undermine significantly 
the ability of American research universities to innovate, develop programs to 
generate intellectual capital, and create IP.  IP laws vary globally.  China, for 
example, asserts that all IP belongs to the government.  These views seem to be 
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based philosophically on Confucianism (Alford 1997).  Confucian traditions do 
not place value on individual property rights.  These radically different views on 
IP rights create an inherent conflict between western nations and China.  
Historically, there have been two attempts to reform Chinese copyright laws at the 
beginning and end of the 20th century.  Both attempts failed.  These philosophical 
issues are the foundation for the government’s concern with foreign graduate 
students. 
Research Talent Shortage 
 The preconceived notion of a shortage of scientific investigators has been 
a topic of conversation for decades, with data suggesting that the US is meeting 
the demand of graduating advanced-degree holders in STEM fields (Greenberg 
2003, Weeks 2015).  The challenge is not the number of graduates, but the desire 
of those graduates to choose to enter the research sector; overwhelmingly, they do 
not.  The lack of interest in entering a postdoctoral career in research is attributed 
to two factors: the length of time it takes to secure a postdoctoral appointment and 
the meager salary paid for the work (Greenberg 2003).  
Since World War II, the US has been tremendously successful in 
recruiting foreign-born scientists for US-based research activity; however, the 
nation is now losing ground because other countries are putting salary and other 
incentives on the line for the best talent to join their ranks in the realm of research 
(Guarino, Rauhala and Wan 2018, Gupta and Wang 2016, Weeks 2015).  China, 
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for example, is funding the recruitment of talented scientists more successfully 
compared to its primary competitor, the US.  China is attracting bright minds by 
funding large-scale science projects like the world’s largest radio telescope and 
massive particle accelerators.  
China also has amended its policies so that foreign researchers are allowed 
to lead Chinese public research projects.  Further, more and more elite scientists 
are moving to China to conduct their research because of large paychecks and 
ongoing funding agreements.  Scientists say that language and access to resources 
like Google are drawbacks, but the benefits outweigh the challenges, which are 
not insurmountable (Normile 2018). 
Research talent and hard science skills are sought after highly.  Computer 
scientists are in high demand, not only in academia, but also in the private sector, 
which offers higher salaries and strong benefits programs (Greenberg 2003, Metz 
2018, Weeks 2015).  There is a national shortage of computer science faculty 
because these individuals can enter private industry and make, on average, five 
times the salary of a tenure-track professor.  This challenge has had tremendous 
consequences for many universities with computer science programs, including 
limiting the number of computer science majors and eliminating it altogether at 
liberal arts universities, thereby putting additional burden on the small pool of 
computer science faculty remaining in the education sector (Flaherty 2018).    
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Cyber Security 
 One hardly can turn on the daily news without hearing about new cyber 
incidents or cyber crimes.  While much of the population (and certainly much of 
the faculty at research institutions) is aware of the growing problem of cyber 
security, individuals may not be aware of the significant scale of the problem and 
the substantial effort and expense expended to address the problem (Wilday 
2018).  Because we are inundated with reports of cyber incidents on a daily basis, 
people simply may have become accustomed to the fact that a cyber problem 
exists; this numbness might cause one to assume that the problem is an acceptable 
fact or that it is being solved properly already. 
 However, the scale of the problem makes it a truly cataclysmic issue.  
Cyber criminals conduct cyber crimes for the most basic of human motives—
profit.  There is no doubt that cyber crime is profitable.  Experts currently 
estimate cyber crime as generating at least $1.5 trillion in revenue each year 
(McGuire 2018).  Table 2 breaks down that total. 
 
Table 2 
 
Breakdown of Cyber Crime Revenue (Adapted from McGuire 
[2018]) 
 
Cybercrime Revenue per Year 
Illicit/illegal markets online $860 billion 
IP/trade secret theft $500 billion 
Crime-as-a-service/crimeware $1.6 billion 
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Ransomware/extortion-based malware $1 billion 
 
 
This total—$1.5 trillion—is a tremendous amount of money.  To put it in 
context, if cyber crime were a nation-state, it would have the 13th-largest GDP, 
pushing Australia to number 14 on the global list of top 20 exporters (Prableen 
2019). 
Ransomware has been in the news for the past few years and has become a 
topic discussed by many.  However, as can be seen from Table 2, the billion-
dollar ransomware problem is less than one-twentieth of 1% of the value of IP 
theft to a potential cyber miscreant.  This makes research universities huge targets 
(Gamache, Senator Cornyn questions for the record for Dr. Kevin Gamache, 
Chief Security Officer, Texas A&M University System 2018, Halbert 2016, Ross 
2018, Saady 2018, Timmons 2018). 
While a full discussion of the dangers inherent to cyber attacks and the 
need for a conference of cyber security is beyond the scope of this report, two 
points are extremely important when discussing the protection of intellectual 
capital and IP theft from research universities: insider threats and advanced 
persistent threats. 
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Insider threats. 
In a survey conducted by CA Technologies, more than 90% of 
organizations reported feeling vulnerable to insider attack (Schultze 2018).  An 
insider threat can be defined as a threat that comes from a person or people inside 
the organization.  While most think of this concept as an insider with malicious 
intent, insider threats can come from employees and other people with access who 
unintentionally threaten the organization. 
Individual users are the most common vector for cyber security attack 
(Schultze 2018, Thomas 2018).  Often, cyber attackers gain access to computer 
systems by means of phishing or spear phishing (Nihco, Fakhry and Uche 2018).  
Phishing is the process of sending emails to users with links they can click on that 
will either spread malware or viruses or attempt to gain information from the user 
that can be used to compromise systems, such as a fake bank login.  Spear 
phishing is a more targeted form of phishing where the message is populated with 
information familiar to the user to encourage them more powerfully to interact 
with the trap. 
Once these users become compromised, the high level of access that they 
have within the organization, coupled with the multiple number of devices on 
which they may have access to sensitive data, becomes an extreme challenge for 
security (Schultze 2018).  If given access, the miscreant essentially can act as the 
user, either to insert malware or trapdoors that let in others or to access data with 
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which the user is entitled to interact.  Both of these options are strong enablers for 
IP theft. 
In order to combat this issue, organizations are taking proactive measures 
such as user training and awareness, deterrence methods, and behavioral-
monitoring methods for both data and users (Schultze 2018).  Popular tools to 
implement these methods include data loss prevention, encryption and identity 
verification, and access management solutions. 
Another type of insider threat is that of a malicious bad actor.  While 51% 
of companies surveyed expressed concern over accidental or unintentional insider 
threats such as carelessness, compromised credentials, or negligence; 47% of 
companies expressed concern over threats from insiders who would cause harm 
deliberately (Schultze 2018). 
Insider attacks are real and occur frequently; 33% of organizations have 
experienced 1 to 5 insider threat–based cyber attacks in the past 12 months 
(Schultze 2018).  Some 73% of companies perceive that insider attacks continue 
to occur at the same or more frequent levels.  The possibility of foreign 
researchers acting as negative insider threats is one of the greater concerns of the 
government and other interested stakeholders (Gamache 2018, Grassley 2018).   
In addition to profit motives for the individual, there are much larger and 
complex pressures that could come to bear on foreign students working on US-
based research teams (Cimpanu 2018, Demchak and Shavitt 2018, Department of 
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Defense 2018, Edwards 2016, Lawder 2016, Shoebridge 2018).  For example, 
countries such as China have specific goals to develop and acquire IP and often 
have been accused of stealing IP.  A given product of research could prove 
valuable for its owner, which is one of many reasons why one entity would want 
to obtain research developments from another. 
When foreign entities have students inside US universities, these students 
could feel pressure to act in certain ways to further the interests of their host 
countries.  The pressure could vary from something simple like national pride and 
support of one’s country to something more specific—negative pressures like 
threats against a student’s family or positive threats like obtaining status and 
financial gain upon returning home.   
Advanced persistent threats. 
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) pose great danger to American 
research institutions (an example is the Iran hacking incident discussed in detail 
later in the reprot).  APTs are cyber attackers who initiate attacks using several 
different techniques and vectors conducted by stealth over time to avoid detection 
(Tankard 2011, Li, et al. 2018).  This type of attack allows deep and wide-ranging 
access to computer systems and organizations.  Information can be stolen over 
long periods and go undetected.  The cyber attackers also can place hooks into the 
environment that are very difficult to remove during a specific attack (or ever). 
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Because of the complex and compromising nature of APTs, they require 
substantial skill, expertise, resources, and manpower to conduct.  As such, most 
APTs are thought to be sponsored by nation-states such as Vietnam, South Korea, 
China, Russia, Iran, and others, as well as by criminal organizations (FireEye 
2019).  Experts believe that the recent attacks by Iran targeting the IP of 
educational institutions and universities from 14 countries were conducted by the 
APT group known as Cobalt Dickens (Osborne 2018). 
Cobalt Dickens is thought to have stolen information from 76 universities 
in 21 countries, 47 private companies in the US, the US Department of Labor, and 
the United Nations (Osborne 2018).  The most recent wave of attacks targeted 76 
universities from 14 countries, Canada, China, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the US being among them.  Universities were sent phishing emails containing 
fraudulent domains; when the users clicked on these domains—making this an 
example of an insider threat—the cyber attackers gained access to target systems 
(Osborne 2018).  This recent example illustrates just how pervasive APTs are and 
how dangerous they can be to universities or other prime targets with valuable 
research. 
Foreign Entities 
Countries around the world are rapidly coming to the realization that IP 
and innovation are the political currency of the new technology-based economy.  
These assets and abilities affect most major domains such as economic viability, 
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effective governance, and military prowess.  This situation creates a complex 
relationship with foreign entities looking to increase their intellectual capital 
through research and study within a university education system that promotes the 
open exchange of information on a global scale. 
China.  
The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee has placed a high 
priority on education and technical innovation as a means to establish a strong 
place on the world stage.  The warlord Yen Hsi-shan attempted to modernize the 
weak Chinese economy in his province by carrying out the Ten-Year Plan of 
Economic Reconstruction (Gillin 1965).  Yen’s outline for promoting economic 
growth in Shansi, China’s First Five-Year Plan, was inspired by the success of 
Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan for the Soviet Union (Gillin 1965).  
China’s first Ten-Year Plan attempted to reduce the autonomy commonly 
enjoyed by local officials in Shansi through economic controls created by the 
reinforced determination to concentrate authority in the hands of a Chinese 
warlord.  Soviet successes caused Yen to become acutely conscious of the 
immense power possible if China’s vast population were liberated together as a 
unified people.  It not only caused him to overlook the economic interests of the 
rich, but also demonstrates why he tried to educate the masses and urged them to 
engage more actively in economic affairs.  Yen’s determination to build an 
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industrialized power-state exceeded both his ambition for the state’s participation 
and his anxiety over a social or economic revolution.  
Confucian centers.  
The Chinese government invests heavily in talent programs aiming to 
attract educators and principal experts in the west.  The growing controversy 
concerning Confucius Institutes in the broader political space transcends the 
ideological conflicts that have fostered the question of what Confucius Institutes 
advocate and how they influence those who learn Chinese language and culture 
all over the world (Hartig 2015).  The Confucius Institute program began in 2004 
led by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hartig 2015).  The 
institutes operate in cooperation with local affiliate colleges and universities 
around the world and are financed between Confucius Institute headquarters and 
the host institutions.  
The stated goal of Confucius Institutes is the promotion of nonprofit 
educational organizations to teach the Chinese language outside China.  The 
program has been successful and is growing (Tang 2010).  By December 2014, 
there were 475 Confucius Institutes and 851 Confucius Classrooms in primary 
and secondary schools in 126 countries (Sun and Cheng 2014).  There are also 
more than 200 institutions in some 70 countries currently applying to have a 
Confucius Institute (Liu 2014).  
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All Confucius Institutes are under the supervision of Hanban, the 
headquarters for the Office of Chinese Language Council International.  Hanban 
is responsible for institute administration, teacher supply, and development and 
distribution of teaching materials.  Although Confucius Institutes were located 
initially in colleges and universities only, in 2007 Hanban launched the Confucius 
Classroom program, a Chinese language and culture program similar to Confucius 
Institutes, but located in high schools.  Usually, the Chinese supply teaching 
materials and send over language teachers, while local partners provide 
accommodation, facilities, and local staff.  The host institutions typically receive 
initial funding of $100,000 to $150,000 per educational hub for a period of three 
to five years.  
Five-Year Plans in connection to education.  
With the birth of a new China in 1949, Mao Zedong chose to lead the 
country on a path toward Maoism.  Based on a Maoist model of expansion, 
China’s socialism produced a fundamentally different governmental organization 
and a new socioeconomic guide called the First Five-Year Plan (1953 to 1957).   
This change was demonstrated best by the urban transformation of Hangzhou 
between 1949 and 1978.  The city of Hangzhou’s urban transformation from 1949 
to 1978 provides an understanding of the urban economy, population 
management, and city-planning ordinances of the First Five-Year Plan (Qian 
2015).  
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The plan prioritized for China the Soviet Union’s development paradigm 
of industrialization over other forms of economic models (Qian 2015).  The plan 
exhibited how essential it is to strengthen the labor market in order to transform 
from a consumption center into a production center.  For Hangzhou, the First 
Five-Year Plan dramatically restructured the city’s economic sectors from 1953 to 
1957.  
    The Second Five-Year Plan (1958 to 1962) brought economic 
adjustment for Hangzhou to set its goal of being a large industrial city.  This 
adjustment unavoidably resulted in urban policy inconsistency and a disparity 
between ideology and practice influenced by the political agenda of the first two 
Five-Year Plans (Qian 2015).  In order to maintain its power and domination 
solidly, the communist state installed spatial preconditions of surveillance and 
control of people’s daily actions through political ideologies such as collectivism, 
population management of youth rustication, and physical specifications of an 
urban commune, self-contained neighborhoods, and Soviet-style planning and 
design.  The realization of Mao’s ideal socialist culture during this period 
prevailed upon the collective interest instead of the private interest and at the 
expense of individual urban citizens (Qian 2015). 
Fast-forward to the Ninth Five-Year Plan, in which national economic and 
social development are stressed and science and technology are the first forces of 
production and education for the nation’s foundation.  The plan provides 
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modernization for the Chinese that can be achieved only through sound 
educational practices that apply to increasing the spirit of the nation in all fields of 
endeavor.  This plan holds science and technology as centers of modernization for 
the Chinese to increase educational practices in all fields of endeavor.  China’s 
Communist Party has implemented all types of strategies to ensure increased 
labor productivity.  
Take, for example, the Thousand Talents Plan, which is now in its 10th 
year of helping China to attract foreign researchers and to incentive Chinese 
scientists living abroad to return home (Jia 2018).  In 2008, China’s central 
government declared the Thousand Talents Plan a scheme to entice leading 
Chinese scientists, academics, and entrepreneurs living abroad back to China.  In 
2011, the scheme grew to incorporate younger talent and foreign scientists, and a 
decade later, Thousand Talents has attracted more than 7,000 people total (Jia 
2018).  For Chinese scientists, the scheme has provided them a powerful financial 
motivation to return home.  For immigrants, it is an opening to join the Chinese 
rule with significant administrative difficulties eliminated.  In the research 
community, scientists selected for talent projects gain access to much higher 
salaries and research funding levels than their locally qualified peers.  Thousand 
Talents proves more formidable than other plans, aiming to target professors and 
chief scientists in the west. 
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Ten-Year Plans in connection to education.   
The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee is concerned with 
education as a means to sustain its control and power solidly over its people. Past 
failures of various definitions for “individualistic property rights” were promoted 
in China by the first Ten-Year Plan during the 1930s.  The warlord Yen Hsi-shan 
attempted to modernize the weak Chinese economy in his province by carrying 
out the Ten-Year Plan of Economic Reconstruction (Gillin 1965).  Yen’s outline 
for promoting economic growth in Shansi, China's First Five-Year Plan, was 
inspired by the success of Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan for the Soviet Union 
(Gillin 1965).  
The growth of the Soviet Union during the Great Depression caused other 
countries that were previously anti-Communist to look to the Soviet Union for a 
solution to economic difficulties.  During the 1930s, Yen and his followers 
frequently lavished admiration on the Soviet Union for its dramatic 
accomplishments in the field of industrial development and advocated adopting 
their methods of growth in order to achieve similar results in China.  Yen believed 
that the Soviet Union industrialized more in one year than other countries 
advanced in five years. (Gillin 1965).  
The first Ten-Year Plan attempted to reduce the autonomy commonly 
enjoyed by local officials in Shansi through economic controls created by the 
reinforced determination to concentrate authority in the hands of a Chinese 
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warlord.  Soviet successes caused Yen to become acutely conscious of the 
immense power possible if China’s vast population were liberated together, not 
singularly.  It not only caused him to overlook the economic interests of the rich, 
but also demonstrates why he tried to educate the masses and urged them to 
engage more actively in economic affairs.  Yen’s determination to build an 
industrialized power-state exceeded both his ambition for the state’s participation 
and his anxiety of a social or economic revolution.  
 Higher-learning institutes in China built by Russian immigrants.     
During the first half of the 20th century, Russian emigrants in China 
established a system of higher learning based on prerevolutionary Russian 
educational systems.  These institutions played a role in strengthening the Chinese 
intelligentsia, with Russian faculty successfully training future engineers, lawyers, 
Orientalist scholars, teachers, theologians, and musicians (Khisamutdinov 2016).   
Today’s higher-education reforms in China are without this generation, 
considering the knowledge of Russian emigrants in China, detailed in the 
following paragraphs. 
During the Russian Civil War (1918 to 1922), hundreds of thousands of 
Russian refugees lived in China.  These Russian emigrants tried to settle close to 
the border because they assumed to return to their country as soon as the 
communists fell from power (Khisamutdinov 2016).  In the beginning period of 
the emigration, most emigrants stayed in Harbin, which was built by Russians as 
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an administrative, educational hub center for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). 
Harbin had Russian schools, Russians made up a substantial part of the 
population, and the administration, police, court, and other institutions functioned 
under Russian laws until 1924. 
Once they graduated from local schools, the children of the initial builders 
and railway employees could advance their education only in their homeland, 
although the matter of higher-education institutions for the CER zone had already 
been raised in 1916 when the Committee for Higher Education formed at the 
enterprise of the railway administration.  The most significant historical and 
educational value of China’s establishments also played a role in developing the 
Chinese thought leaders, with Russian talent famously training future engineers, 
lawyers, Orientalist scholars, teachers, theologians, and musicians.  The political 
issues in China pushed many Russians emigrants to new sanctuaries to 
successfully continue their academic careers (Khisamutdinov 2016). 
Iran. 
The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community has deemed Iran as a presence in cyber espionage and attacks.  Iran 
uses increasingly advanced cyber systems to direct espionage.  Additionally, the 
nation also is attempting to deploy cyber attacks that would facilitate crimes 
against critical infrastructure in the US and its allied countries.  Through the use 
of social media platforms to target these associated audiences, Iranians are 
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targeting American government officials, government organizations, and 
corporations to gain intelligence and position themselves for impending cyber 
operations.  Iran has been developing cyber attacks against the US and its allies 
for some time (Coats 2019).  
These actors are skilled in causing localized, temporary effects such as 
disrupting a large company’s corporate network for days to weeks, comparable to 
its data deletion attacks against dozens of Saudi governmental and private-sector 
systems in late 2016 and early 2017.  This behavior is not new from the Iranians; 
an indictment filed by a federal grand jury in New York City (unsealed in 2018) 
claimed that Iranian hackers stole 31.5 terabytes of data, including scientific 
research, journal articles, and dissertations (Cohen 2018).  The victims included 
7,998 professors at 320 universities around the world over the past five years. 
In what the Department of Justice has reported as one of the most massive 
state-sponsored hacking attacks (APT), nine Iranians acting on the support of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carried out this large-scale mission (Cohen 
2018).  Host institutions paid more than $3.4 billion to procure and access 
documents from an institute in Iran named Mabna that allegedly was set up by the 
accused and that coordinated and paid for the hacks.  The members of the plot 
employed stolen account credentials to gain unapproved admittance to victim 
professors’ accounts, which they utilized to steal research and other academic data 
and documents, including, among other things, academic journal articles, theses, 
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dissertations, and electronic books (Nine Iranians Charged with Massive Cyber 
Theft 2018).  The defendants targeted data across all fields of research and 
academic disciplines, including science and technology, engineering, social 
sciences, medicine, and other professional fields.  The charges against the 
indicated comprise wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to 
commit computer intrusion.  
The indictment stated the university breach as one of spearfishing, in 
which the accused sent emails to victims that deceived them into providing their 
login credentials (CohenMar 2018).  The emails claimed to originate from 
individuals who had viewed articles written by the targeted professors; they 
claimed to be asking to see more of their academic work and rendered a link.  A 
click on the link guided the victim to a fraudulent Internet domain that reflected 
their own university’s website and prompted them to log in.  
Since these acts, American intelligence agencies have singled out Iran as 
one of the leading foreign cyber threats facing America, along with Russia and 
China.  As a result, The Trump administration has reimposed sanctions on Iran to 
prevent its aggression, denying the country funds it needs to finance terrorism and 
its missile program (Riechmann 2019). 
 Naïveté about the threat of foreign espionage.    
The number of international students and researchers in America has 
grown dramatically in recent decades, and with the globalization of American 
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universities, the frontlines of education now serve as  both foreign and domestic 
espionage hubs.  International and domestic intelligence agencies actively are 
choosing sources and informants on American college campuses (Award-Winning 
Journalist Discusses Presence of Spies on Campuses 2018).  Foreign and domestic 
intelligence agencies actively are recruiting subjects and experts on American 
college campuses.  
Take, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has tried 
and failed to recruit foreign nuclear scientists as spies because foreign nationals 
choose instead to hold temporary positions at universities such as Princeton 
(Award-Winning Journalist Discusses Presence of Spies on Campuses 2018).  
Another government agent befriended a scientist and regularly asked him to 
contribute more and more information about his work.  Finally, the scientist asked 
to talk with the FBI on the condition that it would help his son gain acceptance 
into an American college. 
Even further, an academic individual with the moniker Cynthia Murphy 
ingratiated herself as a critical fundraiser for Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential 
campaign.  She was to report findings to Moscow after establishing daily ties with 
classmates and professors who could help with job searching and who held secret 
information and detailed personal data and character traits; findings were to 
include preparatory judgments about the potential vulnerability of the classmates 
and professors to be recruited by the Russians.  
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How Intellectual Property Theft Has Been Addressed in the Past 
The issue of protecting IP from foreign entities is not new.  Protecting 
research has been a concern for many decades.  This section discusses how this 
challenge has evolved over time. 
World War II 
 The concern over security and classification prior to World War II was 
primarily the responsibility of the Department of War and the Armed Forces.  
Classified programs included the protection of military secrets and diplomatic 
communications (National Academy of Sciences 1982).  During World War II, 
the responsibility for military research fell under the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD).  The OSRD used the same classification system as the 
Armed Forces, but it had to keep information at the lowest classification possible 
to communicate and interact with the university environment.   
When the wars ended in Europe and the Pacific, the OSRD was faced with 
the problem of declassifying scientific and industrial information that had been 
achieved or collected during the war.  Some information was released to the 
public, but most of the scientific research was placed under security restrictions.  
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Radiation Laboratory was the 
primary microwave radar research facility in the US after the war.  This facility is 
a great example of the benefits provided to universities and industry from R&D 
conducted during the 1940s (National Academy of Sciences 1982).   
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Atomic energy era. 
 The postwar period saw the rise of the US and the Soviet Union as the two 
global superpowers.  As a result, the federal government became increasingly 
concerned about the protection of scientific information.  One of the first major 
legislations aimed at protecting this information was the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946.  This act restricted the release of information about the Manhattan Project, 
and in 1954 the act was amended to make all atomic energy information secret at 
the time of its creation (National Academy of Sciences 1982). 
Export control. 
 World War II also created the framework for US export control systems.  
The end of the war saw the creation of the Export Control Act of 1949.  This act 
was designed to screen exports to the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries under the Iron Curtain.  The 1949 document was followed by the Export 
Administration Act of 1969 and the Export Administration Act of 1979.  These 
acts were passed with the intention of preventing exportation of goods that could 
assist the economic or military potential of communist countries (National 
Academy of Sciences 1982).  The International Traffic in Arms Regulations were 
established as part of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.  The rules set forth were to 
control the export of military systems, including plans, designs, and production 
techniques of items on the Military Munitions List or any item that could have 
military applications.   
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Committee and office creation. 
The Coordinating Committee for National Export Controls (CoCom) was 
established in 1949 with the intent of organizing North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies plus Japan around trade policies with the People’s 
Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact countries.  Established within the 
Department of Commerce by the Eisenhower Administration in 1954, the Office 
of Strategic Information (OSI) was another measure to stem the flow of industrial 
and military information being transferred to the Soviet Union.  Congress decided 
to terminate the OSI in 1957 because of the negative impact had on scientific 
projects (National Academy of Sciences 1982). 
Restrictions on foreign entrants.  
 Restricting foreign nationals entering the US is another postwar method 
that has been used to prevent the transfer of information, in addition to 
classification and export controls.  The Internal Security Act of 1950 and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 made it much more difficult for 
scientists without US citizenship to receive grants or find work within the US.  It 
was also during this timeframe that the US Congress became concerned with the 
loyalty of scientists conducting unclassified research with the aid of federal grants 
(National Academy of Sciences 1982).  The case of Dr. N.V. Umnov in 1980 is 
an example of a Soviet scientist only being permitted to study his specialty, 
robotics, at a theoretical level.  Dr. Umnov was not allowed to visit industrial 
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facilities in the US, and he was denied access to production research and any 
classified or unclassified research programs funded by the Department of Defense 
because of his nationality (National Academy of Sciences 1982). 
 
Patent review. 
The Patent and Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 required sending to the 
Department of Defense for review all requests for patents with possible military 
applications.  President Eisenhower updated the rules for classification with the 
release of Executive Order 10501, Safeguarding Official Information in the 
Interests of the Defense of the United States, in November 1953 (Eisenhower 
1953).  Generally speaking, the rules were relaxed compared to the Truman-era 
version of this document. 
Sputnik I and Dual-Use Technologies 
 The 1957 launch of Sputnik I shifted the perception of the technology race 
between the US and the Soviet Union.  The Kennedy Administration recognized 
that the US was falling behind and took steps to rebuild America’s competitive 
edge.  The Export Administration Act of 1969 signaled a shift in thawing trade 
relations between the two countries.  The act openly encouraged trade with all 
nations, including communist countries, in hopes that the state of international 
affairs would remain calm (National Academy of Sciences 1982).   
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By the mid-1970s, it was becoming apparent that it was much more 
challenging to separate military applications from civilian technologies.  Facing 
these new challenges, the Defense Science Board commissioned a task force on 
export control of US technology.  The task force found design and manufacturing 
know-how to be the principal elements of strategic technology controls, in 
addition to any product with direct military applications (Office of the Director 
Defense Research and Engineering 1976).   
Shortly after this task force released its findings, the Arms Control Act of 
1976 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 came into effect.  Both acts 
imposed restrictions on the movement of products and plans related to militarily 
critical technologies outside of the US (National Academy of Sciences 1982).  
Significantly, the Export Administration Act of 1979 focused specifically on the 
export of technologies rather than just goods.  The recommendations of the 1976 
Defense Science Board task force were being put into effect.  One of the 
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 was the creation of the 
Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL).  The list identifies technological 
elements essential to advanced military capability, emphasizing manufacturing 
know-how, equipment, goods, and maintenance know-how (National Academy of 
Sciences 1982).   
Early 1980s—Wake-Up Call 
The early 1980s was a period in America where the threat from Soviet 
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intelligence services on the academic community started to gain traction in 
Washington, DC.  The release of the 1981 Soviet Military Power report was a 
wake-up call for the US, particularly for the science and technology communities.  
The Soviets were closing the gap in a number of technology areas including 
electro-optical sensors, guidance and navigation, hydroacoustics, and optics and 
propulsion (Department of Defense 1981).  Soviet military advances in submarine 
forces and weapons were a direct representation of the investment in science and 
technology.  At the time of the 1981 Soviet Military Power report, the Soviet 
Union was believed to have 900,000 full-time scientists and engineers engaged in 
R&D compared to only 600,000 in the US (Department of Defense 1981).  In 
1980, the Soviet Union graduated 300,000 engineers from a total pool of 800,000 
students (Department of Defense 1981).  The report also cited that in 1965 the US 
had maintained a 10- to 12-year development and production gap ahead of the 
Soviets in microelectronics and computers.  By 1980, that gap had been closed to 
two years, mainly attributable to the copying and reverse engineering of US 
technologies (Department of Defense 1981).  Looking at Soviet microprocessors, 
it became very apparent that they were engineered from US integrated circuits.   
Most of the life sciences research conducted during this timeframe 
centered around improving the human within the weapons system.  The Soviets 
invested in underwater physiology, submarine habitability, and aviation 
physiology to improve their military competitive edge (Department of Defense 
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1981).  All unclassified research reports conducted by the US government were 
forwarded to National Technical Information Services (NTIS) under the 
Department of Commerce and were made available publicly for a very small fee.  
Until the Soviets’ permissions were revoked in 1980, they had purchased 80,000 
documents from the NTIS database each year (Department of Defense 1981).  
This basic research saved the Soviets time and money in the R&D phases of 
weapons production.  Any research efforts that dead-ended for the US were 
avoided by the Soviets, and as a result, the technological advantage maintained by 
the US began to decrease.  Research in biological weapons was not a major threat 
during this time period, but the Soviets continued to invest in biological R&D 
activities.       
From 1970 to 1980, the Soviet Union had launched 75 spacecraft per year, 
a rate 5 times more that of the US (Department of Defense 1981).  The annual 
payload in space amounted to 10 times more than the US at 660,000 pounds 
(Department of Defense 1981).  
Academic exchanges.    
During this period, the US and Soviet governments did authorize science 
and technology exchanges.  There were exchanges of scientists and technical 
information, documentation, joint research, and research results (Department of 
Defense 1981).  Inter-Academy exchanges were common, as well as PhD 
candidates from both countries.  Conferences and symposiums were used to 
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advertise research to private companies to secure contracts; these served as 
another avenue that the Soviets would exploit for technology exchange.  
Soviet acquisitions report.   
In 1982, the CIA released a report of how the US’s technical advantage 
had eroded and what the security implications were.  The report cited that the 
overwhelming share of “military significant” technology and equipment was 
acquired through clandestine acquisition and illegal trade (U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency 1982).  Soviet intelligence services also placed a high 
priority on acquiring fundamental research that correlated directly with genetic 
engineering and laser technologies.  In a targeting effort of western universities, 
professors actively were recruited to teach in Warsaw Pact schools that had a 
specific skillset with military applications.  The Soviets were pursuing 
technologies before military applications could be identified and before US 
security controls were implemented (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1982).  
These collection activities normally were conducted at technology trade shows 
and visits to commercial firms in the US.       
In 1981, a Hughes aircraft engineer was arrested and charged with selling 
US secret documents to an eastern European intelligence officer employed by a 
Polish-owned, US-chartered Illinois firm (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
1982).  Figure 2 shows a comprehensive list of illegal acquisitions from the west 
affecting key areas of Soviet military technology (U.S. Central Intelligence 
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Agency 1982, 16). 
 
Figure 2. Acquisitions from the west affecting Soviet military technology. 
Some of the key acquisitions on this list include missile guidance and 
control technologies.  The Soviets used agents in US subsidiaries overseas to steal 
technical data manuals.  One of the most famous industrial espionage cases was 
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the acquisition of detailed specifications, plans, and technical drawings of the US 
Air Force C-5 Galaxy strategic airlift aircraft early in its development cycle (U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency 1982).  These technology gains by the Soviet Union 
saved hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D costs and years of development 
lead time.  The Soviets were able to capitalize on proven western designs and 
minimize military production costs.   
The Soviet Union was able to achieve greater weapons performance than 
if it had relied solely on its own technology, as assessed by the CIA (U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency 1982).  The 1982 report stated that while the direct impact of 
east-west trade on Soviet military power could not be quantified, it was clear that 
western military production would have to compete against capabilities derived 
from western technologies and that the benefits of legal sales to the Soviets were 
not considered to outweigh the costs of those exchanges (U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency 1982).  The report warned that US universities and sensitive-but-
unclassified US technical data would be targeted in the coming years and that the 
scientific communities were not prepared or aware enough to deal with this threat.  
The Soviets were expected to shift their intelligence efforts toward the 
commercial and academic sectors during the 1980s, resulting in a security shift to 
begin addressing security threats in the academic environment.   
The findings of this intelligence report clearly stated that although the 
Soviets used the US’s openness to their military advantage, the US prized too 
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highly that openness and the resultant academic and industrial benefits to close it 
off unthinkably (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1982).  The CIA report 
supported open academic exchange; however, the science and national security 
communities were urged to take steps to identify and protect new and emerging 
technologies with critical industrial or future weapons applications.  
Scientific communication and national security panel, 1982. 
In March 1982, officials from the academic community and the 
Department of Defense hosted a panel on scientific communication and national 
security to address the growing concern of protecting research from foreign 
adversaries, specifically the Soviet Union, without damaging scientific progress 
and its contribution to the national welfare.  It was determined that the Soviet 
Union was exploiting its exchange programs with the US by giving intelligence 
collection assignments to some of its participating nationals (National Academy 
of Sciences 1982).  Some of the exchange scholars from Soviet countries were 
conducting research beyond their agreed-upon fields of study.  The overarching 
consensus from this panel was that the benefits of free exchange of science and 
technology do not outweigh the costs of closing or restricting the academic 
environment:    
There is a strong consensus, however, that universities and open 
scientific communication have been the source of very little of this 
technology transfer problem.  Although there is a net flow of 
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scientific information from the United States to the Soviet Union, 
consistent with the generally more advanced status of U.S. science, 
there is serious doubt as to whether the Soviets can reap significant 
direct military benefits from this flow in the near term. (National 
Academy of Sciences 1982)   
Classification, export controls, funding, and foreign nationals.  
The panel recognized the existence of a number of control systems in 
place to deal with the communication of scientific information.  The first 
classification is that used to control sensitive information with national security 
implications.  The second is export control measures to protect information from 
foreign nationals, such as the Export Administration Act and its associated Export 
Administration Regulations and the Arms Export Control Act and its associated 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (National Academy of Sciences 1982).  
The third method of control comes from research funding sources.  Projects 
funded by organizations such as the Department of Defense may be emplaced 
with restrictions on publication.  The Department of Defense may require 
prepublication review of research topics believed to have national security 
implications.  Voluntary agreements with researchers can limit the flow of 
technical information or negotiate alterations before publication.  The final 
method is foreign nationals being denied entrance into the US to protect scientific 
information.  The government could deny visa requests or mandate restrictions on 
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individuals once they have entered the country (National Academy of Sciences 
1982).  Under specific scientific exchange programs, Soviet or eastern European 
visitors could be limited admission into the US. 
Openness, classification, and gray area. 
 When looking at the categories of university research, three different types 
of information were identified by the panel.  The first category of research 
identified was research for which openness overshadows any possible near-term 
military benefits to the Soviet Union (National Academy of Sciences 1982).  The 
second category identified was research for which classification is clearly the 
right choice under the auspice of national security.  In these circumstances, 
government-supported research resulting in military applications in a short time 
should consider classification.  The third category, known as the gray area, was 
identified as research that does not require classification but requires limited 
restrictions to protect it.   
 The panel recommended that for basic or applied research to become 
controlled in any way, it must meet all four of the following criteria:   
1. The technology is developing rapidly, and the time from basic science 
to application is short; 
2. The technology has identifiable direct military applications; or it is 
dual-use and involves process or production-related techniques; 
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3. Transfer of the technology would give the U.S.S.R. a significant near-
term military benefit; and 
4. The U.S. is the only source of information about the technology, or 
other friendly nations that could also be the source have control 
systems as secure as ours. (National Academy of Sciences 1982, 5)      
It was determined that if the above criteria were met but classification was 
still not appropriate, there were measures that could be put in place to preserve the 
openness of science while still meeting the security needs of the government.   
The first measure was restricting foreign nationals from working on the 
project but not limiting their access to university spaces or enrollment in classes.  
The second measure stipulated that research publications be submitted 
simultaneously to the publisher and the Department of Defense or federal agency 
contracting officer.  The government would be allowed 60 days to recommend 
changes to the manuscripts (National Academy of Sciences 1982).  This 
information was still considered unclassified research; therefore, the university 
still had the right to publish, but the federal government could seek the option to 
classify as appropriate in accordance with federal regulations.  
 Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations should be used between science and industry for unclassified 
information that does not have any national security implications.  A general 
license grants exemption from the formal licensing process.  The MCTL has been 
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recognized as an important tool that can be used in the limited technology and 
research areas where controls have been deemed appropriate (National Academy 
of Sciences 1982).  This list requires updating to reflect accurately some of the 
more rapid innovations being made today.  At the time of the panel, the US was 
transferring industrial technologies to the People’s Republic of China as part of a 
program to help advance “third world countries.”  There were concerns that 
technologies could be transferred to the military sector and that these countries 
could potentially become adversaries in the future.     
Task force on university responsiveness, 1982.  
 With additional restrictions being imposed on America’s colleges and 
universities, the Defense Science Board launched another task force.  The 1982 
Task Force on University Responsiveness was meant to find out if universities 
were interested in and able to support national security requirements in both 
manpower training and basic research (Department of Defense 1982).  The task 
force also investigated what role the Department of Defense should play with the 
NSF in support of basic research, as well as the problems caused by the high 
percentage of foreign nationals in science and engineering fields (Department of 
Defense 1982).   
 The director of the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program 
released a memorandum on December 12, 1980 that attempted to restrict 
publication of unclassified university research results in connection with 
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Department of Defense–sponsored research projects and to restrict foreign 
scholars from participating in these projects (National Academy of Sciences 
1982).  Multiple US universities protested the memo, requiring creation of the 
Defense Science Board Task Force on VHSIC.  The task force came up with the 
following recommendations: “(1) no controls on basic research, (2) research with 
commercial proprietary value should be subject to EAR, (3) dual-use research that 
has distinct military sensitivity should be regulated under ITAR, and (4) single-
use defense technology should be classified projects (National Academy of 
Sciences 1982, 105).  
The Millennium 
Task force on basic research, 2012. 
In 2012, the Defense Science Board released the Report of the Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Basic Research.  It identified a number of 
impediments preventing the Department of Defense’s research program from 
functioning as smoothly as possible.  The board also recommended doubling the 
existing doctoral fellowship programs within the National Defense Education 
Program (Defense Science Board 2012).  To make these fellowship programs 
more competitive, stipends needed to be provided to compete more closely with 
other civilian research programs.  Another major finding of the Defense Science 
Board was the globalization of basic research and the importance of working side-
by-side with foreign scientists.  The task force recommended increasing foreign 
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basic research from 3% to 5% and increasing invitations to foreign scientists 
(Defense Science Board 2012). 
National Security Higher Education Advisory Board 
disestablishment.  
In February 2018, the unit chief of the FBI Office of the Private Sector 
dispatched a letter to the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board 
(NSHEAB) announcing its disestablishment.  The NSHEAB was a forum for 
discussion of national security issues between leaders of the higher-education 
community and federal agencies, including the FBI, CIA, National Security 
Agency, Office of National Intelligence, and Department of Defense (Mitchell 
2018).   
The letter from the FBI stated that because of restructuring, the academic 
community would have to engage the FBI through other means, but that 
communication with academia would remain a priority for the FBI (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2018).  The president of the American Council on 
Education (ACE) responded to the FBI director to express concern over the 
disestablishment of the NSHEAB.  The ACE recognized the recent heightened 
security concerns regarding international students and purported to be looking for 
a way to rebuild the relationship that the NSHEAB created between academia and 
government agencies (Mitchell 2018).   
ADDRESSING IP THEFT WHILE PRESERVING RESEARCH 
 
76 
 
Policy Affecting Intellectual Property Theft 
As information theft has existed for several decades, there are plenty of 
policies affecting the issue.  This section summarizes some of the major policies 
that affect this problem.  Understanding historical policy provides insight into 
how the issue has evolved over time, which can inform future recommendations 
to address the current state of the problem. 
National Security Decision Directive 189. 
In 1985, the Reagan Administration released national-level policy on 
controlling the flow of science and technology in federally funded fundamental 
research labs.  National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 provided a 
comprehensive definition of what qualifies as fundamental research, and it would 
be the policy of the administration to ensure that products of fundamental research 
were kept unrestricted to the maximum extent possible (The White House 1985). 
This policy was based on the 1982 Scientific Communication and National 
Security report, which determined that significant technology was being 
transferred to the Soviet Union but that open scientific communication of 
fundamental research was only a minor contributor to the overall problem (The 
White House 1985). 
In November 2001, Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, briefed the Council on the Future of Technology and 
Public Policy regarding export controls and fundamental research.  She stated that 
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the current administration would continue to support the provisions of NSDD 189.  
The free exchange of ideas and science would continue to be key to US national 
security (Rice 2001). 
In 2008, John Young, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics, released a memorandum to the secretaries of the 
military departments and joint staff to reinforce the language of NSDD 189.  The 
memorandum also clarified the definitions of fundamental research and 
contracted fundamental research.  It would be the policy of the Department of 
Defense not to restrict disclosure of the results of contracted fundamental research 
unless the research were classified for reasons of national security (Young 2008).   
Again in 2010, Ash Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics, released a memorandum on the importance of keeping 
fundamental research free and open.  Products of fundamental research were to 
remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible, and classification was 
viewed as the only appropriate mechanism for restricting this information (Carter 
2010).  These memorandums and NSDD 189 continue to remain the policy 
documents governing the Department of Defense Basic Research Office. 
Department of Defense policy. 
Department of Defense Instruction 3210.1 lays out the department’s 
priorities and conduct for support of basic research.  It explains the importance of 
basic research and its position as a long-term investment in the nation’s future 
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(Department of Defense 2018).  This instruction follows the principles outlined in 
President Clinton’s 2000 Executive Order 13185, which was designed to 
strengthen the partnership of the government and university research.  The 
executive order created four key provisions for the government and universities: 
research is an investment in the future; the integration of research and education is 
vital; excellence is promoted when investments are guided by merit review; and 
research must be conducted with integrity (Clinton 2000).  
National security and defense strategies.     
It is important to note how the current administration views the threat 
posed by Russia and China to national security.  The 2017 National Security 
Strategy acknowledged China and Russia as seeking to challenge American 
power, influence, and interests and attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity (Trump 2017).  The document stated that the US must preserve its lead 
in research and technology and protect the economy from competitors who 
unfairly acquire IP (Trump 2017).  Departments and agencies must eliminate 
unnecessary regulations that stifle growth, drive up costs, and impede R&D 
(Trump 2017).  The US must continue to attract the innovative and the inventive 
and must invest in early-stage R&D (Trump 2017).  These strategy points 
reinforce the importance of free exchange and recruiting talent.     
The National Defense Strategy released by the Pentagon followed the lead 
of the National Security Strategy, but it pointed to a strategic shift in the balance 
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of power.  Interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, was noted as the primary 
concern in US national security (Mattis 2018).  The Department of Defense has 
shifted to meet this new enemy, and the US military and R&D competitive 
advantage are concerns.  Shortly after the release of the National Defense 
Strategy, Secretary Mattis released a memorandum establishing the Protecting 
Critical Technology Task Force.  The urgency of this task force was cited because 
American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars to theft and expropriation 
each year (Mattis 2018).  The document also cited concern for the loss of 
classified and controlled unclassified information.  The academic community 
must recognize this shift as it did in the 1980s—that American universities are a 
soft target and that Russia and China seek to capitalize on free and open exchange 
provided by the US.      
Reframing the Issue 
The dialogue surrounding the issue of IP theft by foreign individuals is 
complex.  A significant factor adding to the complexity is the fact that both sides 
of the problem solvers seem to be talking at each other rather than to each other. 
One side takes the viewpoint that foreign research assistance from particular 
countries could be bad actors, and the other side asserts that research is a pivotal 
part of human advancement and must not be hindered by petty issues. 
During the research conducted by this team, it became clear that two key 
concepts need to be clarified so that proper dialogue can occur to effectively 
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address the problem: (1) IP theft versus intellectual capital loss and (2) 
understanding the real issue behind the concerns of foreign research assistance—
general security for research projects.  Once these items are defined and framed, 
the research team believes that clear communication can occur to work on the 
problem and address it properly. 
Intellectual Property Theft Versus Intellectual Capital Loss 
IP theft implies that information was identified explicitly as valuable and 
then was stolen.  One challenge inherent in this discussion is that, often, no one 
knows if the product of research will be significant until after the research is 
conducted or is at least near complete.  And so while processes do exist to protect 
sensitive or significant research, the research must be classified as such from the 
beginning to prevent malicious parties from being involved—a classic Catch-22. 
With an increasingly global and technology-based economy, it has become 
very difficult to understand the implications of each new discovery.  Assuming 
that every piece of research will become sensitive or valuable would create 
restrictive controls that hinder the advancement of science and information 
sharing.  Failing to address the concern that research will become sensitive or 
classified invites the opportunity for bad actors to steal a valuable product. 
Hence, the real concern is the loss of intellectual capital.  Intellectual 
capital implies that there could be valuable content created during research that 
later would become IP.  Understanding this distinction creates a framework and 
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vocabulary with which to address the issue—it does not change the primary issue 
of not knowing whether a research effort will be valuable, although sometimes it 
is known whether research will be sensitive or classified.  Thus, this team 
suggests that the real issue is not IP theft, but intellectual capital loss, which can 
be in the form of IP theft.  Framing the problem in this way creates the need to 
address protecting research and its eventual product proactively and allows both 
sides to explore the issue properly. 
Foreign Researcher Issue Versus General Security Issue 
The government has strong concerns about using foreign researchers on 
government-funded research projects (Department of Defense 2018, Edwards 
2016, Gamache, Senator Cornyn questions for the record for Dr. Kevin Gamache, 
Chief Security Officer, Texas A&M University System 2018).  These concerns 
stem from the fact that other countries have a vested interest in developing 
intellectual capital and IP to advance their agendas.  Many nations are working to 
develop capital and IP to foster economic growth and other capabilities. 
While these concerns are not unfounded, the real issue is securing research 
projects properly and ensuring that information is not obtained by those who are 
not authorized to have it.  As such, this needs to be seen as a general security 
problem or an information security problem.  Research teams in the universities 
that house them need to have proper security in place to protect research.  The 
truth of the matter is that no one wants anyone to take information wrongfully and 
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distribute it or use it without proper permission—whether it’s being taken by a 
foreign researcher or an American research student with malicious intent.  
Consequently, the narrative needs to evolve to focus on having proper 
security practices in place to protect valuable research so that it can be released at 
the appropriate time to the appropriate parties.  By changing the narrative and 
focusing on the fundamental issue, both sides can discuss the problem in a 
meaningful way and ensure that research is safe, not only from the perceived bad 
actors today, but from any bad actors in the future.  The variables affecting this 
problem are far more than nation-states sending students to American universities 
to become researchers. 
 As previously discussed, there is a shortage of researchers in the US, and 
talent is scarce.  Further, the convenience and collaboration offered by the Internet 
makes it much easier for bad actors to attempt to gain access to valuable material.  
It’s unfortunate, but the same technology that makes it possible to share 
information instantly also makes it possible to steal information just as quickly.  
Consequently, all of the issues that affect this problem must be taken into account 
when examining it. 
Recommendations to Address Theft and Preserve Academic Freedom 
This section provides recommendations from the research team on how 
government concerns around IP theft and intellectual capital loss might be 
addressed.  These recommendations are based upon an examination of the 
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literature review, research team analysis, discussions with AAU and APLU 
contacts, and an AAU and APLU member-institution survey on best practices 
(AAU & APLU 2019). 
As the discussion in this report indicates, fundamental research is a vital 
part of economic growth and new scientific discovery.  For this reason, properly 
protecting the product of research is essential.  The following list of 
recommendations is offered as a means to address the problem of intellectual 
capital loss while simultaneously preserving the practice of fundamental research.  
These recommendations are divided into two categories, those made by the 
research team based on general research and those based on the best practices 
shared from the AAU and APLU member-institution survey.  Research team 
recommendations are annotated by the acronym RT, and survey-based 
recommendations are annotated by the acronym SR. 
Core Principles 
Two core principles were observed in making recommendations to address 
the problem.  The first is protecting the concept of fundamental research and the 
free flow of information.  As previously discussed, fundamental research has 
made countless scientific advances that are critical to human existence and have 
benefited the entire world for generations, from aviation to medicine to forensics 
to meteorology to astronomy to digitization—the list goes on and on. 
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 The second core principle is preserving the free flow of research talent.  
As there is a critical shortage of research talent, finding research assistance can be 
challenging, particularly in high-need areas such as technology, where 
undergraduate students can enter the workforce and earn six-figure salaries (Metz 
2018, Sample 2017).  With research talent being in such low supply, preference 
was given by the team to recommendations that offer preservation of the ability to 
acquire talent where available. 
Research Team Recommendations 
The following recommendations were developed by the research team 
after reviewing the available literature and applying the risk management 
framework.  The research team explored information from a broad range of data 
sources and then worked together to formulate recommendations based on 
internal collaboration and discussions with members of the AAU and APLU. 
RT1: Implement research communication agreements. 
One of the government’s strongest concerns regarding research, especially 
research funded by the federal government, is the possibility of intellectual capital 
loss or property theft by untrustworthy or bad-acting members of the research 
team (insider threats).  Essentially, the fear is that a member of the team will 
release or sell the information before it is properly protected or distributed as 
intended.  One way to address this concern is to implement research 
communication agreements for all members of a research team. 
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 A research communication agreement outlines the communication 
protocol for a research team.  It holds members responsible for ethical obligations 
to keep research materials confidential and appropriately protects and outlines the 
appropriate messaging for releasing and sharing research-related data.  This 
practice sets expectations and ensures that information is not released when it 
should not be, either accidentally or intentionally.  
 Moreover, establishing a baseline for communication protocol helps 
address the government’s concern about information being leaked intentionally 
from bad actors inside the research team.  Not only does this baseline address the 
concern voiced by the government, it is also a standard practice used by the 
government and countless organizations in the private sector.  Also, this solution 
reinforces the sensitivity of the research to the research team to help them 
internalize information security better. 
 Lastly, one of the more complex issues regarding government research is 
the desire to protect potentially sensitive research results.  This issue traditionally 
has acted as a Catch-22 because research must be regarded upfront as classified 
based on value, but it’s difficult to know if the results of research will be sensitive 
or valuable until after the research is conducted and the results are produced.  A 
communication agreement represents a middle ground, providing a layer of 
security while the research is occurring so that the principal investigator can 
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determine if the research is sensitive and engage the proper process to protect the 
research. 
While it’s easy to suggest that the responsibility for understanding when 
research becomes sensitive belongs to the government program manager, all 
stakeholders should have a vested interest in protecting valuable information and 
ensuring that it’s handled appropriately.  Working under a communication 
agreement enables all stakeholders to be more effective in protecting information. 
RT2: Create a scholarship incentive program—National Science 
Scholarship for Service.  
Scholarship incentive programs have worked well to develop new talent 
when needed.  Typically, these programs are referred to as scholarship for 
service.  One such example is the CyberCorps®: Scholarship for Service funded 
by the NSF (OPM 2019).  This program provides up to two years of tuition, as 
well as a living stipend, to third- and fourth-year undergraduate and graduate 
students.  In exchange for these benefits, students agree to give a year of service 
for each year paid for by the program.  Students can fulfill their service obligation 
by working for government agencies at the federal, state, local, or tribal level.  If 
students do not fulfill their service obligation, they agree to repay the funds 
expended on their behalf as a loan. 
These programs have been in place for more than two decades and have a 
strong history of producing new talent.  The research team recommends that a 
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program be created to facilitate increasing research talent in the US with the 
suggested name National Science Scholarship for Service.  We suggest that this 
program be modeled after other scholarship-for-service programs, where 
awardees receive full tuition and a living stipend and be asked to work in a 
research-based job for two years for each year paid for by the government. 
RT3: Recruit more research talent from undergraduate and graduate 
students. 
The only way to get more research talent inside the US is to create more 
research talent from within.  Universities should work within their own student 
base to develop future researchers and encourage students to explore research 
opportunities.  While this has always been a goal of research institutions, the 
dearth of research staff makes this a new imperative.  Developing programs to 
garner interest in research and teach research skills should receive more resources 
and emphasis. 
RT4: Create a path to citizenship for foreign researchers. 
Another way to address the dearth of researchers available in the US and 
the strong need for research talent is to create a path to citizenship for foreign 
researchers.  After attracting this talent and working with them to gain research 
skills, it makes sense to create an opportunity for them to stay in the US, perform 
important work, and add to the diversity of the population. 
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For example, a special student visa program could be created for research 
students who come to the US.  After completing their degree programs, they 
could become eligible for a special work visa for researchers, similar to the H1B 
program for workers with in-demand skills.  Upon obtaining this work visa, 
researchers would work for a four-year period, after which they would become 
eligible to obtain residency.  They then could become American citizens in the 
normal course of the citizenship process. 
This recommendation would go a long way in attracting top research 
talent and retaining the talent currently refining their skills.  It further addresses 
the concern over foreign research talent being loyal to their foreign entities.  
Giving a foreign student the prospect of earning American citizenship would go a 
long way to mitigating this concern and would act as a hedge against foreign 
influence. 
RT5: Collaborate to create a security capability maturity model. 
CMMs long have been used in the technology industry and the private 
sector to describe having mature operations that are effective and utilize 
repeatable processes.  Research institutions should come together in a 
collaborative fashion and establish a university research security CMM.  In this 
way, expert administrators and faculty could work together to define a model that 
would reflect the needs of academic research institutions uniquely. 
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With this model in place, institutions would work to obtain the appropriate 
level of capability.  After an institution prepares itself, it then can submit for 
certification at the appropriate level.  This process creates several value 
propositions.  First, it would create a common nomenclature and vocabulary for 
understanding the preparedness status of an institution and what level of work it 
can process effectively and safely.  Second, it would serve as an indicator by 
which to grant awarding institutions according to the level of maturity of the 
research institution’s security model.  Last, it would create a roadmap or template 
for individual institutions to improve their effectiveness. 
Both the Department of Homeland Security and the National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology offer guidance on building and integrating CMMs 
(DHS 2014, NIST 2017).  It is imperative that research institutions come together 
and work in a collaborative fashion to create a model that works explicitly for 
thems and their peer institutions.  While this effort will take significant 
investment, the research team believes that these activities would create 
substantial value. 
RT6: Implement noninvasive standardized secure research spaces. 
Historically, one of the main challenges to security is that it often comes at 
the cost of convenience.  This is a double-edged sword because if things are 
inconvenient they won’t be used.  And while convenient spaces are used more 
readily and frequently, information can be easily compromised.  The team 
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recommends that universities look at creating research spaces with preapproved 
secure infrastructure.  Essentially, universities could look at creating pods for 
research work that would be preconfigured and would use known secure reference 
architecture for Internet connectivity, resource sharing, encryption, authentication 
schemes, and outside communication.  The cyber security put in place in these 
pods should be as invisible as possible to the principal investigators and other 
researchers. 
 Creating secure and nonintrusive environments would ensure that research 
teams better embrace security protocols and can be protected.  Further, because 
many of the security issues inherent in cyber security, such as encryption and 
secure access, would not inhibit research functions, it should be possible to create 
environments that are secure from cyber attacks but that do not inhibit research 
work.  Working to derive a solution in this way would attack the problem at both 
ends, proactively ensuring that research areas are secure and that the users of the 
system, in this case researchers, fully participate and utilize best practices for 
security. 
Recommendations Derived from Organizational Member Surveys 
The following recommendations were derived from reviewing the best 
practices shared by AAU and APLU member institutions (AAU & APLU 2019).  
These ideas are particularly valuable because they come from groups working in 
the field daily to address the problem.  Further, because the stakeholders who 
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created these practices have a working knowledge of how academic institutions 
operate and what it takes to enact changes in policy, these recommendations are 
rooted in experience and practicality. 
SR1: Implement information security awareness and mitigation 
strategies. 
One of the results from the AAU and APLU survey of member institutions 
recommended a comprehensive communication campaign to increase the 
awareness of faculty and other campus community members of current reporting 
requirements (AAU & APLU 2019).  The research team suggests that this 
recommendation be expanded to encompass a comprehensive communication 
campaign strategy regarding information security and research security. 
Research has demonstrated that end-users are the most common vector for 
cyber threats (Aguilar 2015, Morgan 2017, Thomas 2018).  Increasing user 
awareness through training has been shown to reduce security incidents and 
protect information.  While many students and faculty are knowledgeable about 
technology, they may not realize the intricacies associated with this specific 
problem and that the university community members are specific targets.  Several 
member institutions incorporate modules that discuss foreign entity–related 
security issues, such as protection of IP, export-controlled research, preserving 
scientific integrity, and specific guidelines for reporting suspicious behavior 
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presented in faculty and student training on Responsible Conduct of Research 
(RCR). 
SR2: Create high-level working groups and task forces. 
Universities have a long-standing tradition of collaboration.  Several AAU 
and APLU member institutions have created cross-campus working groups and 
task forces comprising senior faculty and administrators working together to deal 
with the issue of security threats from foreign entities (AAU & APLU 2019).  
This sort of collaboration is vital to sharing best practices and information, and 
the research team recommends that these working groups be expanded to more 
institutions.  Further, these working groups could be used to execute the 
recommendations mentioned above, such as creating a CMM for research and 
other administrative procedures. 
SR3: Develop guides and templates with which to review foreign 
contracts, grants, and gifts. 
Establishing guides or templates for faculties and research teams to use 
provides hands-on guidance for relationships with foreign entities.  Having these 
tools reinforces proper behavioral procedures.  Further, this setup ensures that 
appropriate disclosure, reporting, and compliance with export control laws are 
used.  Having written standards and templates or checklists is a time-tested and 
proven tool to ensure consistency, efficiency, and reliability for processes and 
critical tasks. 
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SR4: Establish a point of contact or liaison for federal security 
officials. 
While it may be the responsibility of federal officials to provide oversight 
for government-funded research, it’s in everyone’s best interest to ensure that 
sensitive research products are identified early and cared for properly.  
Establishing a single point of accountability or contact for federal agencies would 
aid this effort greatly. 
A single point of contact would help ensure that communication is concise 
and accurate.   Additionally, having someone with a strong relationship with these 
agencies would enable institutions to keep up better with trends and changing 
guidelines, which would help with reacting quickly to new requirements and 
would limit surprises.  Most importantly, it would cement a good working 
relationship among organizations. 
SR5: Establish a foreign-affairs review office to complement the 
compliance control office. 
Because interactions with foreign entities are under high scrutiny and can 
have ethical implications, universities should establish a foreign-affairs review 
office, which could be a similar body to an institutional review board.  This 
organization could provide the previously recommended templates with which to 
review foreign contracts, grants, and gifts—templates that would help faculty and 
research teams manage their relations with foreign entities so they do not 
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inadvertently engage in unwanted activity that would raise concerns with export 
control regulations.  Additionally, this organization could provide a check-and-
balance and review the template transactions.  The organization could provide a 
rigorous review, ensuring that there are no export control violations and that 
proper disclosures are made. 
The foreign-affairs review office also could create templates and 
guidelines for conflict-of-interest reporting requirements.  Some institutions have 
implemented rigorous practices to identify faculty and researchers with foreign 
interests, as well as their affiliations with foreign institutions of higher education.  
The new office also could serve as an innovator in this area and work to identify 
new administrator policies and procedures, such as expanding conflict-of-interest 
policies to include conflict-of-commitment policies.  Working proactively in this 
area would help ensure that there are no conflicts of interest with the institution 
that later could become problematic. 
This office also could create a set of requirements for vetting foreign 
visitors.  Many campuses hold policies that require faculty to notify university 
officials when foreign nationals are coming to visit and tour facilities.  A 
recommended best practice is to have the hosting faculty member fill out a brief 
questionnaire or form for each visitor. 
Many research universities have an export control compliance office, and 
those that do not should consider implementing one.  These offices help facilitate 
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the creation of export control policies and programs so that clear guidance exists 
in conducting research involved in export-controlled activities.  This office also 
could provide outreach to faculty, administrators, staff, and students to create 
awareness about export control policies and to ensure appropriate implementation 
of technical control plans.  Additionally, this office could review contracts and 
agreements with foreign entities and other sponsors of research, as well as grant 
terms, to ensure compliance with export control requirements.  Placing these two 
offices in close proximity to each other, given their similar missions, could create 
synergy, information-sharing, and resource-sharing opportunities that would 
strengthen the ability of research institutions to address the issue of IP theft. 
SR6: Create robust disclosure requirements for intellectual property. 
Several institutions have identified the need to require specific disclosure 
of IP that has the potential for commercialization.  Faculty are encouraged to 
identify IP with strong commercial value early so that efforts can be made to 
protect it, such as applying for patent protection.  This practice helps ensure that 
IP is identified quickly and protected for future use and distribution. 
SR7: Develop a process for travel and provide safeguards for 
traveling faculty. 
Multiple research institutions have created programs to review faculty 
travel.  Often these programs are administered by the export control compliance 
office.  Activities conducted in this effort include reviewing software-use 
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restrictions and other security and safety concerns.  Specific actions included in 
this process are items such as cleaning and hardening devices including smart 
phones, tablets, laptops, and other electronic devices to ensure that they are safe 
from cyber attacks after travel to specific countries that are considered known 
threats. 
Summary 
The US government has identified intellectual capital loss and IP theft as a 
significant danger to research institutions.  Consequently, there are many 
proposals being considered to address this problem that could have drastic 
ramifications for research institutions.  These recommendations could result in the 
reduction of funding available for research projects, restrictions on the ability to 
use foreign research talent, new classification standards that inhibit the ability to 
conduct fundamental research, and the perception that foreign students and 
researchers are unwelcome at universities in the US.  If not addressed, these 
consequences will impact dramatically the ability of research universities to 
conduct fundamental research and enable scientific discovery. 
 Academic stakeholders must work with the government to address these 
concerns, a task best accomplished by changing the narrative to security-based 
rather than foreign entity–based.  This shift in perspective will allow everyone to 
focus on the problem rather than the players, which will create a robust system to 
address issues from multiple threats rather than one or two isolated foreign 
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entities.  These solutions also have to contend with the fact that the academic and 
research landscape, as well as the global climate, have changed significantly over 
the last several decades.  The US is no longer the clear leader in all areas of 
scientific knowledge.  The Internet greatly enables collaboration and also creates 
threat vectors through which technology and information can be stolen from a 
distance and in a skillful manner.  The US is facing a research talent shortage and 
depends on foreign students and research staff to conduct fundamental research.  
Working together, the government and academia can address this complex 
problem by first acknowledging its existence and framing the issue properly.  The 
utmost care must be taken to preserve the ability to exchange information freely 
and conduct the fundamental research that drives innovation, the sharing of 
knowledge, and the creation of IP—the cornerstone of scientific discovery.  
Failing to do so would be disastrous for the advancement of knowledge and the 
US economy.  
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